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METHODOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS AND THE
SLAVERY CASES; OR, NIGHT-THOUGHTS OF A
LEGAL REALIST
LOUISE WEINBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION: A NIHILIST QUESTION
My assignment was to say something in commemoration of a
great private methodological codification.1 But recently, my mind has
been turning back to the writers we think of as American legal real-
ists.2 It was as though they were voices of my conscience. Long ago
they had convinced me that the intervention of methodological for-
malisms in the decision of a case would simply conceal its "inarticulate
major premise."3 I had supposed that the ghosts of the realists would
have been satisfied with some of our modern methods. Yet now I was
beginning to think that perhaps the realists were saying that we do not
need and should not have methodological systems at all. In the field
of conflict of laws, Professor Friedrich Juenger has been advancing
similar ideas for some time,4 but I had not internalized that thinking.
I had not worried about responding to it.
* William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice, The University of Texas.
This Article was written in preparation for a panel presentation offered January 6,
1997, in Washington, D.C., at a meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. I am
especially indebted to Paul Finkelman, Mark Gergen, Calvin Johnson, and Andrew Koppel-
man, for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971).
2. I am thinking particularly of Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924), and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the
Law, 10 I-HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
3. Cook, supra note 2, at 487. The phrase is a variant of Holmes's, of course, from his
dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("General
propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or
intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise.").
4. See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAw AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 151-73 (1993).
Taking up this view, see, for example, Luther L. McDougal III, The Real Legacy ofBabcock v.
Jackson: Lex Fori Instead ofLex Loci Delicti and Now It's Time for a Real Choice-of-Law Revolu-
tion, 56 ALB. L. REv. 795 (1993). For a similar view in the present Symposium, see William
L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REv. 1371 (1997). See also, e.g.,
PatrickJ. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave
New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REv. 79 (1993); Stanley E. Cox, Back to Conflicts
Basics, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 525 (1995) (reviewing JUENGER, supra); Stanley E. Cox, Razing
Conflicts Facades to Build Better Jurisdiction Theory: The Foundation-There Is No Law but Forum
Law, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (1993); RussellJ. Weintraub, Choosing Law with an Eye on the Prize,
15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705 (1994) (reviewing JUENGER, supra); Joachim Zekoll, Choice of Law
and MultistateJustice, 69 TUL. L. REv. 1099 (1995) (reviewingJuENER, supra). For a related
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It occurred to me that it would be ideal on this occasion to take a
set of cases that could be expected to lend support to a nihilistic view,
and to examine those cases in the hope of rescuing conflicts law from
its detractors. I had been interested recently in cases in American
constitutional history in the antebellum period.5 So I naturally
thought of the perennially interesting cases on the conflict of slavery
laws. The slavery cases exhibit to perfection the characteristic I
needed. The antebellum conflict of slave laws was so essentially polit-
ical that the argument for conflicts methodology would have to be
severely tested by them. Moreover, those cases have long intrigued
writers in American legal and constitutional history,6 as well as writers
in conflicts theory.7
analysis see Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 949 (1994).
5. For recent writing, see Symposium, Bondage, Freedom & the Constitution: The New
Slavery Scholarship and Its Impact on Law and Legal Historiography, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 1685
(1996), especially Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns Case,
Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 1793 (1996); James Oakes, "The
Compromising Expedient": Justifying a Proslavery Constitution, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 2023
(1996); William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1711 (1996). See also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Inden-
tured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 Mo. L. REV. 743 (1996); Jonathan A. Bush,
Free to Enslave: The Foundations of Colonial American Slave Law, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417
(1993).
6. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE
AGE OFJEFFERSON (1996);JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
OLD SOUTH (1990); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAw, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT
CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1981); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977); Paul Finkelman, "Let Justice Be Done,
Though the Heavens May Fall" The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 325 (1994); Paul
Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal Development, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1009 (1993); Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV.
77 (1985) [hereinafter Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History]. On the teaching of
slavery as part of constitutional law, see Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitu-
tional Law, 68 CHI.-KNT L. REV. 1087 (1993).
7. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
(1981); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975); A.E. Keir Nash, In re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The Relation of Law and
History, 82 MICH. L. REV. 274 (1983); John Phillip Reid, Lessons of Lumpkin: A Review of
Recent Literature on Law, Comity, and the Impending Crisis, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571 (1982);
Note, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 74, 75 (1971). For a
conflicts-theoretical approach, see Harold W. Horowitz, Choice-of-Law Decisions Involving
Slavery: "Interest Analysis" in the Early Nineteenth Century, 17 UCLA L. REV. 587 (1970). Use
of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), to teach conflicts is seen in the late
James Martin's casebook, now under the distinguished authorship of Lea Brilmayer, and is
described in an insightful late-appearing symposium contribution,Jane E. Larson, "A House
Divided" Using Dred Scott to Teach Conflict of Laws, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 577 (1996). Some
good discussion of the slavery cases in the conflict of laws can also be found in Seth F.
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial
Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451 (1992).
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One of the more memorable essays on the slavery cases and the
conflict of laws,8 as it happens, appeared on the eve of the promulga-
tion of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.9 Its author, Harold
Horowitz, was trying to show then exactly what I am trying to show
now: the uses of conflicts thinking even in such cases.1" Professor
Horowitz argued that choice-of-law ideas that were very much in the
air in 1970 were implicit in the slavery cases. He pointed out that, if
the right to the services of a slave was adjudicated in a northern, free
state, the slave state and the free state each would have an "interest" in
"having its policy prevail."11 You would have a "true conflict."' 2 How
would the northern court resolve it? He argued that antebellum
courts often reached "reasonable accommodation [s]" through reason-
ing analogous to more modern methods; in his view, the slavery cases
thus could provide "a useful background on which courts [could]
draw today" in trying to resolve conflicts.1"
So I thought I could profitably revisit those cases. But from the
beginning, it was borne in on me that there was something about the
slavery cases that made it almost impossible to analyze them. They
seemed political enough to make a legal nihilist out of anyone. I dis-
covered, first, that I was unhappy with my distinguished predecessor's
analyses of them. His analyses were dispassionate, uninfluenced by the
fact that in the slavery cases there might be a right answer. But of
course there was a right answer.14
8. See Horowitz, supra note 7.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
10. See Horowitz, supra note 7; see also HAROLD HOROWITZ & KENNETH KARST, LAw, LAw-
YERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1 (1969).
11. Horowitz, supra note 7, at 591.
12. Professor Horowitz also considered similar cases in some southern courts as well.
See id. at 595. Technically, such cases typically would not present "true conflicts," because
the southern state, as the joint domicile, is the only interested state. The fact of past tem-
porary sojourn in a northern state would presumably be an insufficient basis for attributing
to the northern state an "interest" in governing the relationship between the parties inter se
at the time of decision. Let me add, for the nonspecialist, that "true conflict" is a term of
art. In a true conflict, the respective laws of two concerned states not only differ, but each
also could rationally and constitutionally govern. Such "governmental interest analysis" fol-
lows Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U.
CHI. L. REv. 227 (1958). For the link between rationality and constitutionality, see Gene R.
Shreve, Interest Analysis As Constitutional Law, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 51 (1987); Louise Weinberg,
Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 440 (1982).
13. Horowitz, supra note 7, at 593, 601. In particular, Professor Horowitz found strong
analogies to "comparative impairment" reasoning, a technique for resolution of "true con-
flicts" described in William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1,
18 (1963).
14. I might qualify this remark in view of cases like Selectmen v. Jacob, 2 Tyl. 192 (Vt.
1802) (per curiam), in which the court's abhorrence of slavery was such that it refused to
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Whether it is generally a good idea to take into account the judg-
ment of history in historical writing, in the case of slavery I do not
think it would unduly entangle one in anachronism or whig interpre-
tation to do so. Today's moral position is not merely the triumphal-
ism either of the winning side in the Civil War or of Warren Court
enthusiasts. Rather, our shared position today-that law supporting
racial slavery was immoral-was also, to a surprising extent, the moral
position of the antebellum courts, south as well as north.
How, then, could Professor Horowitz have praised northern "ac-
commodations" to the laws of the slave states? It is true that there
were sincere antebellum beliefs, shared even by some abolitionists,
that the greater good sometimes required enforcement of slave law.
Although we would not remit an American to racial bondage today on
any idea of "the greater good," it was these ideas, I think, that Profes-
sor Horowitz read, not inappropriately, as examples of conflicts rea-
soning. Even so, Professor Horowitz was aware of the moral
difficulty,15 and would have avoided it if he could. His aim was simply
to use the slavery cases for the analogies they presented, as a vehicle
for demonstrating the usefulness of "reasonable accommodations" in
choosing law. Nevertheless, despite his best efforts, he wound up do-
ing just the opposite. How useful is a dispassionate accommodationist
approach to choosing between two answers, one of which in the judg-
ment of history is intolerable?
I started all over, determined to bring a fresh interest-analytic eye
to these cases. Yet the more I looked at them, the less it seemed to me
that I could say anything sensible about them. The "interest analysis"
that the better courts today achieve in conflicts cases, with or without
the Restatement (Second), seems at best simply beside the point in the
slavery cases. It is hard to care if the "slave state" is "an interested
state." Today, of course, any "interest" of a state in enforcing slave law
charge the slavemaster with the care of a sick, blind, old slave woman whom he had aban-
doned. Id. at 196-98. The result would be more clearly wrong, perhaps, if the old woman
herself had sued; one assumes the decision in this case simply allotted her upkeep to the
village of Windsor, Vermont. Cf Latimer v. Alexander, 14 Ga. 259, 262 (1853) (holding
that a slaveowner has a duty to care for his slaves, but that the hirer of a slave also takes on
this duty); Gibson v. Andrews, 4 Ala. 66, 68 (1842) (holding that the owner may not con-
tract out of the duty to furnish slaves with medical care).
15. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 7, at 588 (acknowledging that "[s]ome will think it
tasteless" to deal with slavery as a problem in accommodation of conflicting laws); id. at
592-93 (citing with approval as a reasonable accommodation the decision of the Illinois
high court that a resident could be prosecuted for helping a slave to escape, and similarly
discussing with approval a decision by the Supreme Court of Connecticut refusing to free a
slave in temporary sojourn in the state).
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would not be a legitimate one. 16 Nevertheless, even if antebellum
courts knew that too, even in the south, and to some extent I think
they did, we cannot say that therefore all such conflicts were "false."
That would be much too abstract a formulation. Those conflicts were
real enough to lead to civil war.
We could not account at all for the persistence in one place of
law widely condemned elsewhere, like the law of slavery, if we did not
suppose either that it occurs among indoctrinated people, or that it is
so entrenched in the political and economic life of a polity that peo-
ple see it as a necessary or even irreversible evil. The slave states had
very strong interests-in-fact. Increasingly, it would have taken courage
for southern judges to set aside slave law, even with the cover of judi-
cial device.17 Nor could we account at all for the liberalism of some of
the northern judges, knowing the north's own racism, and its ties to
the south'S-to southern cotton, to the south's outlets to the sea-
without attributing to the northern judges an equally ideological posi-
tion from which it increasingly would have taken political courage for
them to depart. So the northern states had strong interests-in-fact as
well.
Suppose, then, that one overlooked technical niceties and took
the view that the two-state slavery cases presented true conflicts in all
courts. How, then, would one solve such a conflict? By preferring fo-
rum law? That is the approach I have recommended in my own previ-
ous work, 9 but that approach would hardly do in the slavery cases. A
goodly number of those cases would be tried in the courts of some
slave state, and I did not feel that consistency in application even of
my own recommended approach would merit re-enslaving anyone.
Certainly any more formalistic approach would be disastrous. A
mandatory resort in any court even to the best imaginable choice rule,
on the face of it, would be akin to saying "eeny, meeny, miny, mo"-
not a good way to secure someone's release from bondage.
In fact, the judges in the slavery cases did not always treat them as
conflicts cases. Despite the respectable body of literature examining
the two-state slavery cases as exercises in choice of law,2" those cases
did not always turn on reasoning that we would identify as conflicts
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. See generally Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, supra note 6.
18. See generally Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story, Slav-
ery, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1086 (1993).
19. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 CEo. L.J. 53 (1991); Louise Weinberg, On
Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REv. 595 (1984).
20. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 7.
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reasoning or as analogous to conflicts reasoning.2 1 What one finds is
that the judges quite often refer to the desirability of intercourse be-
tween the states, free of penalty to slaveowners or the likelihood of
retaliation by an offended sister state. Sometimes they mention the
technical rule that ordinarily the domicile should determine the sta-
tus of persons. But the cases do not hinge on such things. Most tell-
ingly, judges in those days did not seem to have authoritatively laid it
down that some particular mode of choice of law would have to be
used at the outset in all two-state cases in their courts. Too much was
at stake, at least in the slavery cases, to make justice as blind as that.
There was an easy access to discretion which our courts today do not
enjoy. Most of these cases, whether or not taking the ideal of "comity"
into account, were decided as close to their merits as the judges could
get.
What the slavery cases do show is one of the things legal realists
like Walter Wheeler Cook22 would later discover: conflicts cases are
not very different from domestic cases.2 3 In fact, legal conflicts tend
to be internal to the forum state, even in two-state cases. What we
think of as conflicts are likely to be internal policy clashes, not just
conflicts between two states' laws. 24 These cases show that, whatever
courts may say they are doing, if the result is dispositive it is a decision
on the merits. In this sense there are no "conflicts cases"-there are
only cases.
Understanding this, it becomes clear that rules that purport to
select a place to "govern" in supposed ignorance of what the law is at
that place are somewhat beside the point. If the policies that are in
21. Professor Finkelman employs terminology like "lex loc?' to describe the results in
some of the slave cases throughout his excellent book, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federal-
ism, and Comity. FINKELMAN, supra note 7. But I have found little choice-of-law language of
that kind in the slave cases I have read. Sometimes ajudge will mention a common under-
standing about choosing law, but the slave cases I have examined do not seem to turn on
choice-of-law reasoning.
22. See Christopher Shannon, The Dance of History, 8 YALE J.L. & HumAN. 495, 501
(1996) (book review) (referring to Cook, the critic of conflicts laws, as "the greatest of the
realists").
23. Cf Cook, supra note 2, at 469, 475, 478 (arguing that a court "enforces not ...
foreign ight[s] but a right created by its own law").
24. For analogous analyses, see Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Ac-
tual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1743, 1756 (1992), arguing that the Supremacy Clause re-
quires reconceptualization of the federal-state conflict of laws as a clash of national
policies; Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 836 (1989) (same);
Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. Rxv. 1191, 1225-26 (1977) (same).
For an analogous discussion of internal conflicts among domestic courts as problems in the
conflict of laws, see Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Domestic Splits of Authority and Interstate Choice of
Law, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 521 (1994).
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conflict are forum policies, there is no other "place" that is going to
govern. More fundamentally, if the conflict is among internal forum
policies, then "forum preference" is obviously not an answer; it is the
question.
It is true that the slavery cases are extraordinary cases, at the ex-
treme limits of morality. One might want to think of them as excep-
tions,25 from which little of general application can be learned. Yet
Professor Horowitz's essay was right in presuming that no principled
line could be drawn between the slavery conflicts in antebellum courts
and the workaday conflicts that are adjudicated under any choice-of-
law method. Whether or not there is a clear right answer in a given
case, as there is in the slavery cases, courts adjudicate substantive
rights and obligations. Every such litigated issue of law is important to
the parties. And results matter. Cases are commonly judged by their
outcomes; and formal reasoning, however elegant, cannot save from
condemnation a foolish or unjust result. In any event, as long as there
are still laws discriminating, for example, against homosexuals, we
cannot say that seriously wrong law in this country is a thing of the
past.
Reading the slavery cases in this light, I found myself, quite
stunned, asking the heretical and in fact nihilistic question whether
having a special body of law for the conflict of laws has not been a
mistake. Perhaps we should abandon the enterprise. The whole en-
terprise.26 I am reminded of my beloved old copyright professor, Ben
Kaplan, who, during lectures, used to confess, a little helplessly, from
time to time, "Well, you know, boys, I don't believe in copyright." But,
however devastating the slavery cases may be to current theory, they
also persuade me that it would be a mistake for courts to deny them-
selves access to choice-of-law solutions, even if it were possible to do
SO.
I will make some necessary preliminary remarks and then try to
tell, from my own point of view, the general story of the slave cases as
they evolved significantly over time. I will then come back to the chal-
25. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 260-61 (1992) (arguing that it "would
be a serious error to design choice-of-law rules around slavery and abortion, instead of
around the thousands of routine conflicts between ordinary laws," because ordinary cases
require no "escape hatches").
26. Cf Rensberger, supra note 24, at 534 n.55 ("Significantly, the demise of a particular
choice of law theory has never [led] to the rejection of the choice of law enterprise. In-
stead, motivated by a desire for uniformity, scholars have always provided a replacement
for rejected choice of law theories.").
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lenges the slavery cases present to theories of deciding how to decide
cases.
II. THE INTERNALIZED NATURE OF A CONFLICT OF (SLAVERY) LAWS
The conflict of slavery laws was essentially the same in all courts.
A legal realist would say that a conflict of slavery laws played out at the
forum as an internal conflict of domestic policies. A legal realist would
also say that, in this, a conflict of slavery laws was no different from
other conflicts cases.
Suppose, for example, a slavery case in a southern court. A wo-
man born as a slave asserts that she became "free" by residing in a free
state, by operation of its laws. From the point of view of the court-a
court in a slave state-the free state might seem to have only the re-
motest "interest" in the liberty of this freedwoman who had become
free while temporarily residing on its territory. The southern state is
the joint domicile of the parties. The freedwoman no longer resides
in the north. She stands now at the southern bar of justice. Her
"owner" has valuable rights of property in her under the law of this
state.
But who would re-enslave her?27 The judge at the slave state
would feel the weight of the property claims of her alleged "owner,"
but he would feel also the force of her claim that she is free. The
fascinating thing is that the courts of the slave states in such cases
typically did rule in a slave's favor, at least until near the close of the
antebellum period, as we shall see shordy. They sometimes said they
were extending "comity" to the laws of the "free" state.
Now, a realist would also point out that there is no difference
between the case just described and one in which a slave had any
other ground for claiming freedom. Why should it matter that she
had resided in a free state? All that was required was that she assert
any colorable ground on which the court could hold her free. The
two-state configuration was not the only configuration that would en-
gage a southern court's internal policy struggle between its interests in
27. Cf. Lord Mansfield's remarks before decision in Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499
(K.B. 1772): "Compassion will not, on the one hand, nor inconvenience on the other, be
to decide; but the law .... Contract for sale of a slave is good here .... But here the
person of the slave himself is immediately the object of enquiry; which makes a very mate-
rial difference." Id. at 509 (Mansfield, C.J.). On the other hand, The Slave, Grace, 166 Eng.
Rep. 179, 183 (Adm. 1827) (Stowell, J.), held that a slave who had lived as a slave in Eng-
land, but sued for freedom upon her return to the West Indies, had lost her rights, the
status of slavery having reattached to her. The Taney Court also was of the view that a slave
state could re-enslave a returning freedwoman. See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.)
82, 93-94 (1850) (Taney, C.J.) (dictum).
1997] 1323
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
enforcing slave law and its interests in liberty. In a conflicts case,
courts would attribute the interest in liberty to a free state; but in
wholly domestic cases, the slave states would find other ways of ruling
for the slave, although there was no sovereign but their own to whom
the interest in liberty could be ascribed.2
The existence of liberty interests in a slave state should not really
surprise us. The ideals of the Revolution, 29 after all, must have been,
to some extent, the ideals of Virginia and South Carolina as well as of
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. They became the ideals of Missouri
and Texas as well as of Ohio and Wisconsin. Even if one does not
read the antebellum Constitution as embracing this "higher law," it
existed in other founding documents: the Declaration of Indepen-
dence of 1776 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.30 It existed
most usefully in judicial language, as we shall see, language that courts
both north and south freely adopted as expressing their own policies.
As these expressions became embedded in authoritative judicial opin-
ions, they became positivistically identifiable as the policy of the state.
So, notwithstanding the racism and racial laws of those times, the
ideal of personal liberty was widely shared, north and south.
The ideal of personal liberty failed to become national policy-
and this is part of the tragedy of the antebellum era-only because it
was crowded out by the emergence of an apparent strong national
policy pointing the other way.3 It is one of the wrenching turns in
the story of the slavery cases that an apparent proslavery national pol-
icy emerged in the antebellum period and came increasingly to tran-
scend every other ideal in the minds of some of the northern judges:
the imperative of appeasing the south and holding the Union to-
gether. The Taney Court did nothing to delegitimize this policy and
in fact did everything it could to appease the slave interest. This was
28. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
29. See generally Christopher L.M. Eisgruber, Justice Story, Slavery, and the Natural Law
Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 273 (1988); Thomas C. Grey,
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30
STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
30. Ordinance of July 13, 1787, reprinted in I CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS AND
REcoRDs, 1776-1787, at 168 (MerrillJensen ed., 1976). The Ordinance was enacted by the
Confederation Congress, which was sitting in New York during the Constitutional Conven-
tion in Philadelphia. Among other things, the Ordinance abolished legalized slavery in all
of the old Northwest Territory, an area occupied today by Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wiscon-
sin, Michigan, and part of Minnesota.
31. See infra notes 139-220 and accompanying text.
32. This is substantially the view of FEHRENBACHER, supra note 6, who argues that the
southern courts' insistence on northern "comity" was paralleled by John C. Calhoun's de-
mand for exclusive federal protection for the rights of slaveowners. See id. at 139-41. These
issues emerged in Supreme Court cases and eventually, fatefully, in the Civil War.
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the nature of the northern proslavery "interest" that competed for vin-
dication at a "free" forum.
The late Robert Cover's 1975 book, Justice Accused 3 set out to
blame the antebellum judges who enforced the laws of slavery for
their too-rigid positivism.3 4 But Cover's work became more nuanced
than that. He understood that some of the judges who struggled to
satisfy the claims of slaveowners did so from a conviction that this was
their solemn obligation under the Constitution, the embodiment of
the bargain that held the Union together.35
This was the firm belief of Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts.
Although Shaw found ways of freeing those slaves who had been
brought into the Commonwealth with the consent of their masters, he
felt quite different about runaway slaves. To his mind, the Fugitive
Slave Clause of Article V3 6 was part of a constitutional compromise
without which the south would never have ratified the Constitution. 7
As the Civil War approached, some northern judges persisted in ex-
tending comity, where they could, to southern law, from a naive but
sincere belief that by doing so they could appease the south and save
the Union. And some judges in the south, who hitherto had extended
a humane comity to liberating northern law, came to believe that it
was essential to the survival of the south's social system to support it
more consistently.
So it is possible to view the conflict of slave laws in all courts as a
conflict between proslavery policies, reflecting some supposed greater
good (whether to preserve the slave system, as in the south, or, as in the
north, to obey the commands of law,3" or to encourage interstate com-
33. COVER, supra note 7.
34. Id. at 226, 235.
35. Id. at 119.
36. The Fugitive Slave Clause provides: "No Person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due." U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
37. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEFJUSTICE SHAW 91
(1957).
38. For some judges the "greater good" was simply fidelity to law. See, for example,
Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416), an action for damages
for harboring a fugitive slave, in which Justice Baldwin, sitting on circuit, instructed the
jury not to indulge their "humane and benevolent feelings," or to forget that "the first duty
of citizens of a government of laws [is] obedience to its ordinances." Id. at 844. The jury
awarded damages of $4000. Id. at 855.
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merce by protecting the property of visitors, 9 or, eventually, to save
the Union), and policies reflecting the ideal of liberty.40
One can often see on the living page this struggle between claims
of legal right and the impulse toward basic decency. Consider one
federal judge's attempt at an evenhanded summary of the situation:
On the one side we have a citizen of a sister state ...
claiming . .. certain property, . . . and insisting upon her
right to my order to have this property delivered to her by
the injunctions of the constitution of the United States,
which I am bound to obey. In the other party .... we have
an individual who has lived among us for more than twenty-
three years; has a wife and family of children depending
upon him, and a home, from all which he must be separated,
if the claimant has made good her right. These are consider-
ations that make it peculiarly incumbent on the judge, who is
to decide the question, and to decide it by the evidence....
He is to yield nothing, on the one side to the power and
patriotism of the state of Maryland, which have been strongly
invoked for the cause of the claimant; nor, on the other, to
any feeling for the consequence of his judgment to the re-
spondent and his family; much less to any opinions of his
own on the question of slavery.41
In these slavery cases, then, as in all litigated cases raising ques-
tions of law, there was a choice, in all courts, between two arguable
positions that reasonable people could and did maintain, notwith-
standing that then as now there was a "right" answer.
III. SOMERSET'S (74SFAND THE EMERGENCE OF THE
MORAL ARGUMENT
It is a mistake to suppose that moral argument does not figure in
the decision of cases. Few judicial pronouncements have had the
resonance of Lord Mansfield's declaration in Somerset's Case,42 as it was
39. Cf In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13 (1854), rev'd sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (20
How.) 506 (1858). In In re Booth, Justice Smith, concurring, complained: "The rights,
interests, feelings, ... of the free states are as nothing, while the mere pecuniary interests
of the slaveholder are everything." Id. at 122.
40. See the remark of William Lloyd Garrison: "With us, the forms of law, legal prece-
dents, and constitutional arrangements are nothing, in opposition to the claims of our
common humanity, the instincts of eternal justice, and the commands of God." THOMAS
D. MoRus, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 1780-1861, at 111
(1974).
41. Case of Williams, 29 F. Cas. 1334, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1839) (No. 17,709) (ultimately
ruling against rendition of the alleged fugitive slave).
42. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
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remembered, that slavery is "so odious, that nothing can be suffered
to support it, but positive law."43 Lord Mansfield could say this even
while acknowledging that slavery did not, in his day, violate interna-
tional law. 44 American judges both north4 5 and South 46 adverted to
Lord Mansfield's language, as did members of the Supreme Court.
4 7
Under the impetus of that language, judges in both north and south,
for much of the period, could be found administering law if feasible
in such a way as to free a slave. This was so even though the moral
argument for liberating slaves sojourning in free states must have
been compromised by the Constitution's provision for the rendition
of "fugitive" slaves. 48
IV. TECHNIQUES OF EvAsION OF (SLAvE) LAW AT COMMON LAW
Judges can and do use all sorts of devices to avoid disfavored law49
or unjust results:5 ° the procedural point; 1 the sidestep; the distin-
43. Id. at 510 (Mansfield, C.J.). For a review of a controversy over what Lord Mansfield
said, see William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the
Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 (1974). The controversy is interesting but
irrelevant; the language has had a life of its own.
44. To the same effect on this point, see The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 74 (1825)
(Marshall, C.J.).
45. See, e.g., Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77, 115 (1859) (stating that "every court of
every state, slave and free, has echoed and re-echoed these immortal words"); Anderson v.
Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 475, 506 (1856) (Swan, J., concurring) (reprinting in full the opin-
ion of Lord Mansfield); Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 212 (1836) (Shaw,
C.J.) (quoting the "odious" segment in Somerset's Case).
46. See, e.g., Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 470 (1820) (Mills, J.) ("Slavery
is sanctioned by the laws of this state, and the right to hold [slaves] under our municipal
regulations is unquestionable. But we view this as a right existing by positive law of a mu-
nicipal character, without foundation in the law of nature, or the unwritten and common
law."). Adverting to Lord Mansfield's language in Somerset's Case, as well as to the Thir-
teenth Amendment, in an 1870 opinion refusing to provide relief in an action for the
contract price of slaves, see Osborn v. Nicholson, 18 F. Cas. 846, 846-48, 850, 854-55 (C.C.E.D.
Ark. 1870) (No. 10,595), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1871).
47. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 498 (1856) (Campbell, J., con-
curring); cf id at 624 (Curtis, J., dissenting) ("'[S]lavery is deemed to be a mere municipal
regulation, founded on and limited to the range of territorial laws.'" (quoting Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 345, 543 (1842) (Story, J.))); Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at
534 (McLean, J., dissenting) ("[S]lavery can exist only within the territory where it is
established.").
48. This was a point made by Benjamin Curtis, arguing for the slaveowner in Aves, 35
Mass. (18 Pick.) at 201.
49. See generally Gumo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)
(discussing a range of judicial strategies for avoiding harmfully obsolescent statutes).
50. See Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1959 (1987)
(suggesting common law strategies that might have been used in certain slave cases).
51. See, e.g., Case of Williams, 29 F. Cas. 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1839) (No. 17,709) (refusing
rendition of an alleged fugitive slave because conflicting testimony could not satisfy the
burden of proof of the alleged slave's identity, which burden was on the master).
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guishing or excepting or narrowing 2 construction; the literalistic
reading;53 and, if all else fails, that biggest of guns and mightiest of
judicial thunderbolts, the "striking down" as unconstitutional. 54 But,
in view of the political weakness and silence of the Marshall Court,
and the silence, punctuated by disastrous rulings, of the Taney Court,
this last technique did not always seem available to antebellum judges;
they characteristically deployed the resources of the common law.
We find cases in southern courts using these sorts of devices to
free slaves. 5 I am thinking of an 1833 case in which the Supreme
Court of Virginia, in adjudicating a slave's right to freedom, disre-
garded the letter of a will to effectuate the presumed manumitting
intent of the testator.5 6 In another 1833 case, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that a secret trust to manumit a slave did not
violate South Carolina's antimanumission statute.5 ' Although ordina-
rily there is nothing surprising in permitting a trust to trump legal
arrangements, a judge bent on vindicating the state's policy against
manumission could have given the statute a broader interpretation
and could have been less hospitable to the hidden trust. Similarly, in
1830 a Georgia court refused to apply, but could have applied, Geor-
52. For a narrow construction of a pleading in a case against a would-be rescuer of a
slave, see Hill v. Low, 12 F. Cas. 172 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1822) (No. 6494) (Bushrod Washington,
Circuit Justice), which held that it was error to instruct the jury that an attempt to rescue a
slave after his arrest was an obstruction of the arrest. Id. at 173.
53. See, e.g., Van Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F. Cas. 1036, 1038 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1853) (No.
16,865) (dismissing two counts of an action for a statutory penalty for harboring and con-
cealing fugitive slaves, on the ground that although the slaves might have been harbored
they were not concealed but kept in "avowed, concerted and systematic defiance of law").
54. See infra notes 191-203 and accompanying text for cases finally striking down the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as unconstitutional.
55. Indeed, as late as 1855 there is a North Carolina case granting liberty based upon
the intention of the manumitting testator "to confer upon [his slaves] the boon they hold
most dear." Mayo v. Whitson, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 231, 239 (1855).
56. See Elder v. Elder's Ex'r, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 252 (1833). As southern attitudes hard-
ened, manumission by will became more difficult in Virginia. See Bailey v. Poindexter's
Ex'r, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132, 152 (1858) (rejecting Elder and holding that when a will leaves
emancipation to the slave's option, the slave having no capacity to elect, the provision is
void and of no effect). But seeJones Adm'r v. Jones Adm'r, 24 S.E. 255 (Va. 1896). The
Jones court stated:
[W]e would not consider [Bailey] as precluding us from a re-examination of that
question, since [it is] in conflict with the prior decisions of this court during a
period of more than 50 years, [was] decided by a bare majority of the court, two
judges dissenting .... and [is] so contrary to reason and to justice that we would
hesitate long before we would hold that a slave could not elect to be free when
that right was given him by his owner.
Id. at 256.
57. See Cline v. Caldwell, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 423, 427 (1833) (per curiam).
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gia's antimanumission law retroactively to a will directing out-of-state
manumission. 8
It is evident that a court can attempt to avoid disfavored law by
remitting the parties to another jurisdiction for their litigation, but it
is also possible that a court could require the parties to go to another
place to perform their underlying transaction. In 1835, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina imposed a duty on executors of an emanci-
pating will to carry out the terms of the will, notwithstanding state law
forbidding emancipation of a slave by will, and held that in order to
execute the will the executors must remove the slave from the state to free
territory.59 In another case, in Mississippi, the court held that a master
could lawfully manumit his slaves by taking them outside the state,
although he could not lawfully take them back into the state.6" In the
same case, the court held also that, although a freedman could
neither enter nor leave Mississippi, if out of the state he could receive
a pecuniary legacy of Mississippi property there.61
Such decisions may be less liberal than they appear. Particularly
in late examples, such cases can reflect what was to become a fixture
of deep south ideology: the policy of absolute adherence to the will of
the slavemaster. This is one way of explaining from a southern point
of view why, when a slave sojourned in a free state against the will of
the master, comity to the free state's law would be withheld.62 This
policy could prevail notwithstanding the fact that in the antebellum
period, as in the colonial period, increasingly there seemed to be an
58. SeeJordan v. Bradley, I Ga. 443 (1830). Later Georgia cases decline to follow Jor-
dan. See, e.g., Sanders v. Ward, 25 Ga. 109, 117-18 (1858); Cleland v. Waters, 19 Ga. 35, 38
(1855); Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 206 (1853). For a useful survey of cases in a range of
southern states, see A.E. Keir Nash, Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the
Peculiar Institution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 7 (1979). The courts of Tennessee and Texas, in
Nash's view, were consistently the most liberal. Id. at 132.
59. SeeFrazier v. Executors of Frazier, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 304, 315-16 (1835); see also A.E.
Keir Nash, Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The
Extraordinary ChiefJustice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C. L. REv. 141, 158, 174 (1969) (discussing
Frazier).
60. See Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246, 269-70 (1858).
61. See id, at 320-21.
62. See, e.g., Louis v. Cabarrus, 7 La. 170, 172 (1834) (reversing a verdict for the slave,
in an action for freedom, and remanding for a clearer showing that the slave's sojourn in a
free state was with the consent of the master).
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issue of public safety6 3 that made even individual manumissions come
to seem unacceptable.64
I mention these last cases, which require or permit removal of a
slave to free territory, because they begin to approach the category of
conflicts cases. The one feature of conflicts cases that sets them apart
from other cases is that they are cases in which the facts span two
different places. But we can also see that the possibility of a second
source of law is not limited to cases in which the facts span two differ-
ent places. Conflicts cases are not essentially different from other
cases in which courts cast about for a device to avoid an otherwise
applicable legal rule.
One of the allures of the strategy of choosing another state's law
is that this device seems so unintrusive. It seems the least disruptive
among the available expedients because it purports to do no struc-
tural damage to the law not applied. True, a choice of another state's
law cannot carry the broad conclusiveness of a "striking down," but it
can at least supply an ethical, if temporary, alternative to bad law. It
can give justice, if only in the individual case.
Somerset's Case can be viewed as a conflicts case in the sense that
Lord Mansfield departed from the domiciliary law, which ordinarily
would have determined the status of persons. James Somerset was set
free even though, under the laws of his home state of Virginia,6" he
was a slave. On the other hand-and this is important because it be-
came a feature of many of the American cases-the reasoning in Som-
erset's Case was not conflicts reasoning.
Starting from the explicit moral premise that slavery was "odi-
ous," and the observation that such "high dominion" is insupportable
by reason and, therefore, could be supported only by "positive" law,6 6
63. An interesting anticipation of this is seen in Lord Mansfield's remarks holding over
Somerset's Case- "The setting 14,000 or 15,000 men at once loose by a solemn opinion, is
very disagreeable in the effects it threatens." Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 509
(K.B. 1772) (Mansfield, C.J.). Mansfield urged the parties to settle, but responded to their
evident refusal: "If the parties will have judgment, 'fiat justitia, ruat coelum;' letjustice be
done whatever be the consequence." Id.
64. Compare, e.g., Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445, 458-59 (1848) (declaring foreign manu-
mission in accordance with Georgia policy), with Sanders v. Ward, 25 Ga. 109, 117 (1858)
(declaring foreign manumission to be "neither within the letter or the spirit of the law").
These examples are offered by Reid, supra note 7, at 593.
65. James Somerset had been domiciled in Virginia, but was being held for eventual
sale in Jamaica. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 499.
66. Id. at 510. Lord Mansfield wrote:
So high an act of dominion must be recognized by the law of the country where it
is used. The power of a master over his slave has been extremely different, in
different countries. The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of
being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law,
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Lord Mansfield made the profound but altogether practical observa-
tion that England had no laws to support the master's dominion over
Somerset or to prohibit Somerset from exercising the freedoms en-
joyed by others in England.6 7 A lesser judge might have imported the
laws of Virginia to legitimize Somerset's detention in England at the
instance of his master. After all, Somerset arose on habeas corpus.6 8
James Somerset was confined to a ship at anchor on the Thames, and
his custodian therefore was the ship's commander, one Knowles.69 It
was Knowles, then, who became obliged to make return to the writ of
habeas corpus. No English official was involved, and no direct blame
need have attached to England for Somerset's detention.
Even so, in a similar situation, another celebrated judge, Chief
Justice Shaw of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, also was able to
reach a liberating decision.70 Shaw used rather different reasoning.
He held that the ship in Boston harbor, the brig Chickasaw, was not
authorized to imprison a fugitive slave.71 From that he leaped to the
conclusion that, even though the two female slaves in that case were
fugitives subject to rendition under the fugitive slave law, they must be
"discharged from all further detention. '"72
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT OF (SLAvE) LAws: MORAL AND
POLITICAL CHANGES
I turn now to the conflict of slave laws proper. We should not be
misled: in slavery cases the antebellum courts did very little reasoning
of a kind we would associate today with the law of conflict of laws.
What these courts did do, typically, was to consider whether they
should exercise their sovereign powers, or, as they put it, should ex-
which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasions, and time itself from
whence it was created, is erased from memory ....
Id.
67. Id. ChiefJustice Shaw held to the same effect in Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 193 (1836), adding the intriguing remark that the freed slave became "entitled to
the protection of our laws." Id. at 217 (emphasis added). ButJoseph Story read the position
more broadly: "It has been solemnly decided, that the law of England abhors, and will not
endure the existence of slavery within the nation; and consequently, as soon as a slave
lands, in England, he becomes ipsofacto a freeman...." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (5th ed. 1857).
68. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 499.
69. Id.
70. See Commonwealth v. Eldridge, reported in DAILY EVENING TRANscRPT, Aug. 1, 1836,
described in LEVY, supra note 37, at 73-76.
71. See LEVY, supra note 37, at 75.
72. Id
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tend "comity" to the law of a sister state on some ground that com-
ported with their own policies.
Historians currently see the story of the antebellum conflict of
slavery laws as having come in chapters. Writers seem to discern two
or three phases in the way courts chose law in slavery cases. v3 I will try
to sketch a quick composite of these views, interjecting an occasional
comment of my own.
A. The First Period: Liberty Law and the Property Exception
In the first period, until the early 1830s, courts of both slave"
and free states 75 are thought to have extended comity to each other's
laws.76 But the cases adduced for that view do not support it.
It is true that southern judges show a relatively liberal humanity
until the later phase of the antebellum period.77 Where a slave had
been freed through operation of law in a free state, judges in the
73. See generally FINKELMAN, supra note 7 (two phases); FEHRENBACHER, supra note 6
(three phases); Nash, supra note 7 (criticizing Finkelman's generalizations about the
phases of conflict of slavery laws); Reid, supra note 7 (comparing Finkelman's and
Fehrenbacher's theories).
74. For the story of the consolidation of the slave system in the south, see generally
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH
(1956). Also of interest is MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860:
CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981).
75. For the story of the early abolition of slavery in the north, see generally ARTHUR
ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH (1967).
Also of value is WIECEK, supra note 6.
76. Northern case law on this problem is much sparser than southern, probably be-
cause slaveowners did not like to sue in the north. Cf Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 193, 207-08 (1836) (Shaw, C.J.) (stating that he cannot find earlier Massachusetts
cases in point).
77. See, e.g., Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246, 313 (1858) (concluding that the law of Indi-
ana had freed Mississippi slaves sent there for that purpose by their owner); Betty v. Hor-
ton, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 615, 621 (1833) (holding that two female slaves had become
domiciled in Massachusetts and therefore could not be reimported as slaves into Virginia);
Lunsford v. Coquillon, 2 Mart. 401, 408 (La. 1824) (holding a slave freed ipso facto by her
owner's remove with her from Kentucky to Ohio with an intention of residing there);
Winny v. Whitesides, I Mo. 259, 261 (1824) (holding that removal of a slave to free terri-
tory with the consent of the master frees the slave, but distinguishing the situation of slaves
in transit); Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 479 (1820) (holding that removal of
a slave to a free state with the consent of the master frees the slave); Griffith v. Fanny, 21
Va. (Gilmer) 143 (1820) (same); Harry v. Decker, 2 Miss. (1 Walker) 36 (1818) (same). Cf
Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 582-83 (1851) (although holding it not a felony to kill a slave,
acknowledging the claims of religion and humanity and the protections of the common
law as opposed to the interests of the master); Graham v. Strader, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173,
182 (1844) (opining that slavery would reattach in Kentucky upon the voluntary return of
a former slave, but acknowledging the claims of humanity).
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south quite often did not think it right to re-enslave her.7 8 In those
days the presence of free black people in a southern state was not yet
perceived as too demoralizing to slaves, dangerous to whites, or debas-
ing to free white labor.
It may be tempting to view these sorts of cases as evidence of a
climate of reciprocal comity. In some cases southern courts said they
were extending comity lest northern courts retaliate. 7' But in fact
even those northern cases that withheld freedom from slaves sojourn-
ing in the north do not seem to support the view that there was a
general rule of comity. Rather, those cases seem to have to do with
the temporariness of the sojourn. If the master took up a permanent
residence in a free state, a slave suing for her freedom there could
have obtained it in this period, as in later periods.8 " But even in
northern courts, especially in this earlier period, it was regarded as
78. See, e.g., Shaw, 35 Miss. at 273; Betty, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) at 625-26; Bland v. Dowling, 9
G. &J. 19, 30 (Md. 1837).
79. See, e.g., Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 AK. Marsh.) at 479 (Mills, J.):
If the comity between this and the state of Indiana is to have any bearing on this
subject [we must consider the ex-slave as free].... [Otherwise, if negroes domi-
ciled in Indiana are] removed, and it is once known that their vested rights are
denied ... , it is calculated to produce retaliatory measures, and to cause them to
detain . .. our transient slaves ....
Id.
80. In Commonwealth ex rel. Hall v. Cook, 1 Watts 155 (Pa. 1832) (on a writ of habeas
corpus), the Cook family represented to the court that, when they moved from the District
of Columbia to Pennsylvania, their slave, Hannah Hall, indentured herself orally for seven
years in consideration of manumission. Id. at 155. The Pennsylvania court rejected this
transparently cooked-up lease-back arrangement and held that the slave became free by
operation of a Pennsylvania statute when brought into Pennsylvania, the master having the
requisite intention of taking up a permanent residence there. Id. at 155-56; see also Butler
v. Hopper, 4 F. Cas. 904, 905 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 2241) (Bushrod Washington, Circuit
Justice) (holding that Pierce Butler's slave, Ben, became free by operation of the laws of
Pennsylvania because Butler was domiciled there at the time; Butler was not then serving
in Congress as representative from South Carolina, and therefore, was not privileged). A
slave born in a free state was often considered free at birth in both northern and southern
courts. In southern courts, see, for example, the remarkably late case of Union Bank v.
Benham, 23 Ala. 143 (1853), which held that a black man born in a free state could try by
habeas corpus the legality of his detention by a sheriff for execution of a debt, although
not permitted to try his freedom against his master by habeas corpus. Id. at 151. The court
observed that "it would hardly be contended, that a white man not held in servitude ....
and confined in jail, could not try the legality of his confinement by habeas corpus." Id. at
155. In Gentry v. McMinnis, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 382 (1835), the court said:
[I]f the defendant's mother was free at her birth, she herself is necessarily free;
and that, if she were born in Pennsylvania since the year 1780, even though her
mother was a slave, she was, by virtue of the abolition statute of that year, born
free, and was only subjected to a state of pupilage until she attained twenty eight
years of age; and that, consequently, the fact that she was brought here, before
she was entitled to liberation from custody . . . cannot have affected her legal
rights as a free person.
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deeply unfair to strip the master of his rights of "property" when the
slave accompanied the master merely in temporary transit in the state
on the way to another state."1 On similar thinking, southern courts
that otherwise would have granted freedom to one whose master had
been domiciled on free soil refused to do so when the sojourn on free
soil was intended to be temporary.8 2
Id. at 390-91; see also Merry v. Tiffin, 1 Mo. 725, 725-26 (1827) (holding, in an action of
assault and battery for freedom, brought by John, a slave, that, having been born in free
territory in Illinois, "John is free," although he had been held in servitude for thirty-six
years).
81. Northern sympathies for the property rights of masters gave way only very slowly.
See, e.g., Willard v. Illinois, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 461, 469, 472 (1843) (permitting a prosecution
under Illinois law for assisting a slave to escape while temporarily in Illinois, notwithstand-
ing the state's abolition of slavery in its constitution; arguing that to do otherwise would
"weaken, if not... destroy the common bond of union amongst us"). Illinois may be a
poor example because its southern sections shared the more southern-leaning sentiments
of the border states. See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 60 (1968). For a disturbing post-bellum example of
this attitude in the Supreme Court of the United States, see Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 654, 661 (1871) (holding the Thirteenth Amendment no bar to recovery in an ac-
tion for the contract price of a slave).
Sometimes enforcement of the fugitive slave laws in northern courts was thought to be
justified on property-rights grounds. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416) (Baldwin, CircuitJustice). A proslavery northerner, Justice
Baldwin charged the jury:
If this is unjust and oppressive, the sin is on the heads of the makers of laws which
tolerate slavery, or in those who have the power, in not repealing them; to visit it
on those who have honestly acquired, and lawfully hold property, under the guar-
antee and protection of the laws, is the worst of all oppression, and the rankest
injustice towards our fellow-men. It is the indulgence of a spirit of persecution
against our neighbours ....
Id. at 843-44. Justice Baldwin went on to say that if a master could not recover his slave
then the creditor could not recover his loan, and the rule of law would come to an end. Id.
at 844.
In the end, "property" rights in black persons were more fully understood, and the
formal abolition of slavery in this country was achieved, although at immeasurable cost,
without compensation to the former "owners." Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 ("But
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any ... claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such .. .claims shall be held illegal and void.").
82. See, e.g., Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 AK. Marsh.) at 479. The difference between the two kinds
of cases is described in Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622, 628 (1856). The court
observed:
Some enlightened jurists in the slave States admit that if the master take his slave
into a free state to reside permanently, that he thereby becomes emancipated,
but, at the same time they hold that if he go there with him for a temporary
purpose.... if the servant return voluntarily into the State where he was legally
held to service, the rights and powers of the master re-attach .... This distinction
between the effect of a temporary and a permanent removal of slaves is maintained
upon the ground that the property of an individual does not cease to belong to
him on account of his being in a foreign State ....
Id. at 627.
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The states were not applying each other's laws criss-cross. Rather,
all states applied the law of liberty, and all states made an exception
for brief sojourns of a slave in the north, in transit.8 3 These results
reflected shared dual policies in all states. The conflicts were not be-
tween the laws of different states, as such, but were internal policy
conflicts of the forum. One measure of this is that in wholly domestic
cases, as we have seen, similar conflicts emerged, with similar results.84
These results had little to do with comity, although the language of
comity reinforces them. Rather, insistence in both sets of courts on
keeping the slave in bondage in "transit" cases was a function of an
ingrained belief, one that was to erode only very slowly, in the possibil-
ity of "property" in human beings.
Northern accommodation to the law of slavery in these "transit"
cases has not been without its defenders. Commentators have valued
the concept of comity for its own sake, or have been concerned for
the expectations of the slaveowners, or for the sanctity of property, or
for the vindication of multistate or national policies. Even today,
many might find worthwhile the north's willingness to pay the price of
injustice in northern courts in the hopes of avoiding retaliatory injus-
tice in the courts of the south.85
It is worth pausing to comment on this idea of retaliatory com-
ity. 6 We are sometimes warned that courts could retaliate for another
sovereign's want of comity by withholding comity reciprocally.8 7 But it
is an oddity of the idea of retaliatory comity that it sometimes seems to
lack affirmative content. In slave cases retaliation is possible, but not
in the sense that, if New Hampshire freed a Georgia slave, Georgia
could retaliate by freeing a New Hampshire slave. It is true that, in
theory, if northern courts freed blacks after short sojourns, southern
courts might retaliate by refusing to recognize their freedom after long
83. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
85. This seems to be the implication of the work of such proponents of comity as LFA
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECrIONS 145-89 (1991); Larry
Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
245 (1991). But see generally Weinberg, supra note 19 (arguing that reciprocal comity poses
risks).
86. The classic case is Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), which refused to recognize a
French judgment because France would not recognize an American judgment. Id. at 228.
Arguably disapproving such retaliations against innocent private parties is Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), which struck down, under the Supremacy Clause, an Oregon
law barring foreigners from inheriting Oregon property if the foreigner's country would
bar an American from inheriting property there. Id. at 440-41.
87. See supra note 79.
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sojourns.8 8 Yet even that "retaliation" could achieve only what the ex-
tension of "comity" itself contemplated: the continued dominion of a
slavemaster over a black. Thus, a rule of "comity" in a slave case in the
north, based on concern over possible retaliation, would trade the
freedom of an individual in a real case for the freedom of a specula-
tive future person in a speculative future case, on the irrational specu-
lation that the court in that later case would be willing to penalize a
party for the unrelated fault of a court far away, even though the same
court sometimes construed its own laws narrowly to free a slave. Even
apart from these unpalatable ideas, the notion that the problem of
conflicting laws should usually be resolved by applying the other
state's laws makes scant sense. As Justice Stone once remarked, to re-
quire full faith and credit to laws in addition to judgments would pro-
duce an "absurd result." In each case of conflict, he pointed out, the
forum would have to apply the other state's laws, but would never be
allowed to apply its own.8 9
A far more persuasive argument in favor of accommodation to
slave law than this concern about retaliation is that the greater good
of the Union might have required "reasonable" accommodation with
the needs of the southern traveler. Certainly, disunion and civil war
present an awful alternative to judicial accommodation.
But we should begin to consider, I think, the difference judicial
insistence on justice might have made. Historians do not like to in-
dulge in counter-factual musings, and little work has been done on
the question whether consistent nonenforcement of slave law in courts
could have succeeded in ridding the country of slavery without war, if
insisted on early enough after the slave trade became illegal. Such
judicial leadership would have required the cover of earlier and better
rulings from the Supreme Court than the country got, but writers also
generally have not considered whether war could have been avoided if
the Supreme Court had done thatjob early enough. What we do have
is a strong strand of thinking that the antebellum Constitution, as it
stood, could have supported even outright abolition. °
88. Eventually, northern courts did decide to free blacks after short sojourns, and
southern courts did decide not to recognize freedom after long sojourns, undoubtedly
antagonized by their northern brethren. But by the time this polarization occurred, there
were such powerful political pressures on both sides that the courts had little choice. See
infra notes 115-138 and accompanying text.
89. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
90. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 537-38 (1856) (McLean, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the Founders opposed the idea of property in man); id. at 572-76
(Curtis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Founders intended to include freed slaves as citi-
zens of the United States); see generally WIECEK, supra note 6, at 202-75; FREDERICK
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B. The Second Phase: The Rule of Liberty and the "Fugitive" Exception
It may be a measure of dissatisfaction with the concept of prop-
erty in human beings that northern courts began to abandon it.9"
Moving into a second, middle phase of the antebellum period, north-
ern courts tended increasingly to take the view, as we might argue
today, that all states shared a reciprocal interest in the liberty of per-
DOUGLASS, My BONDAGE AND My FREEDOM 396 (1855); Frederick Douglass, Speech, "Is the
United States Constitution For or Against Slavery,"July 24, 1851, reprinted in 5 THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 191, 198 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1975) (relying on the
Preamble, the absence of a constitutional guarantee of slavery, and the principles of good
government underlying the Constitution); LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SLAVERY 54-114 (1860) (same); cf. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 216 n.79
(1988) (arguing that even before Douglass took this view, mainstream black opinion also
relied on the Constitution); David A.J. Richards, Comparative Revolutionary Constitutionalism:
A Research Agenda for Comparative Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. & POL. 1, 24 (1993) (pointing
out the earlier abolition of slavery by Britain, the relatively weaker power of the slavery
interest in the early antebellum period, and James Madison's "original constitutional sug-
gestions of a power in the nation to secure that states could not violate a nationally articu-
lated conception of human rights and the public interest"); Robin West, Commentary: On
Constitutional Positivism-Natural Law Ambiguities, 25 CONN. L. REv. 831, 838-40 (1993) (con-
sidering the interpretive issue); Robert Bernasconi, The Constitution of the People: Frederick
Douglass and the Dred Scott Decision, 13 CAuDozo L. REv. 1281, 1288-90 (1991) (describing
the antebellum debate on the question whether the Constitution embodied the ideals of
the Revolution); Randall Kennedy, Afro-American Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Yes, I Would
Sign the Constitution, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163, 164-68 (1987) (arguing that black inter-
ests are better served by faith in the Constitution); see also Abraham Lincoln, Address Deliv-
ered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg November 19, 1863, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
His SPEECHES AND WRINGs 734 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946) (asserting that the nation was at
conception "dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," and that the
nation was founded "[flour score and seven years ago," i.e., in 1776 with the Declaration of
Independence, rather than in 1789 with the Constitution). On the other hand, William
Lloyd Garrison famously dubbed the supposed constitutional compromise a "covenant
with death" in his July 4th speech of 1854 in Framingham, Massachusetts, as he set fire to a
copy of the Constitution. See PHILLIP PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DE.ATHl: THE CONSTITU-
TION, LAw, AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 2-4 (1975). Wendell Phillips also report-
edly made a speech referring to the Constitution (quoting Isaiah) as a "covenant with
death and an agreement with hell," some ten years before Garrison used that term. See
Soifer, supra note 50, at 1920 n.14; see alsoJOHN PIERPoNT, A DISCOURSE ON THE COVENANT
WITH JUDAS (1842), cited in The Latimer Case, 5 LAw REP. 481, 492 (1843).
91. FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 99, finds that Willard v. People, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 461
(1843), is the last major northern-state case furnishing protection to the "property" of a
slaveowner in transit; but as he points out, Dred Scott restored the right of transit. See
FINELMAN, supra note 7, at 282. See generally Reid, supra note 7, at 574-81 ("The Northern
Reaction Against Comity").
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sons within their respective borders.92 Increasingly, northern courts
were willing to grant freedom to sojourners unconditionally.9"
Southern judges in this period also could be found extending a
willing, humane comity to the liberating laws of the north. It was at
this time that courts began to rely heavily94 on Lord Mansfield's posi-
tion in Somerset's Case, that the institution of slavery was so "odious"
that it could be maintained only by "positive law."95
What would happen, then, under these evolved better under-
standings, during this middle period, when a slave came into "free"
territory? What if she were then returned to her home in a "slave"
state?9 6 The answers to such questions came more sharply to depend
92. Cf Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("In the modem age,
humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the nations of the world
to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective
interest.").
93. Arguably it had become easier for northern courts to take a moral stand. The
gradual manumission laws, in place by 1804, would have had the unintended consequence
of producing a transfer of the northern slave population to the south, see ALEXIS DE Toc-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 397-98 (Henry Reeve trans., 8th ed. 1848), as
northerners in slave states like New York, Pennsylvania, and NewJersey perceived that they
must liquidate their investments in slave property. Some northern legislatures reacted to
these sales, and to the concomitant breaking up of black families in the north, by prohibit-
ing the export of slaves for sale. But the slave population of the north dwindled rapidly.
Indeed, the northern black population could not have been anywhere near that of the
south even at the time of the Constitutional Convention. In The Federalist No. 54, for exam-
ple, Alexander Hamilton or James Madison treats the problem of slavery as a problem of
the southern states. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 367, 369, 371 (Alexander Hamilton or
James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Madison's notes of the Convention through-
out show southerners, particularly those of South Carolina and Georgia, as standing for the
slaveowning interest. I do not know how the revolutionary army's recruitment of slaves
affected the different sections; there was a scheme in place by which the owner received
compensation and the slave liberty.
94. Professor Finkelman says that Somerset's Case was not applied in the earlier period.
See FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 41. But see Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 470
(1820) (echoing Somerset's Case in stating that slavery can be maintained only by positive
law, being against natural law).
95. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (KB. 1772) (Mansfield, C.J.). Here I
differ somewhat from the student author of the Columbia Law Review Note, supra note 7, at
92, who thought that from 1830 "courts in both the north and the south took increasingly
divergent attitudes." The Note's author believed thatJosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAws (1834), was responsible for the decline of comity in the slavery cases,
Note, supra note 7, at 93,,since Story left wholly to the forum the question of slave status.
STORY, supra, at 165. I also differ somewhat from Professor Finkelman, who finds more
intransigence in the south in the 1830s than I do, over a broader range of cases and issues
than those considered by me. See FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 181-235. Professor Nash also
has trouble locating much intransigence this early in the south. See Nash, supra note 7, at
295.
96. Under the case of The Slave, Grace, 166 Eng. Rep. 179, 185 (Adm. 1827), the re-
ceived position was that the original domicile did not violate international law by re-enslav-
ing a freedman.
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on whether the slave was a "fugitive," or had been taken by her master
"voluntarily" into a free state.9 7 In "voluntary" cases, as I read them,
the answer would be affected less and less by the duration of the so-
journ in the free state.
The distinction between the "voluntary" and "fugitive" cases was
prompted by Article IV of the Constitution," with its provision for the
return of fugitive slaves.9 9 The distinction was first drawn importantly
by Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts in 1836 in Commonwealth v.
Ayes. 100 One suspects that Shaw drew the distinction instrumentally,
to carve out a class of cases in which "comity" need not be extended to
slave law, although later the distinction came to seem inevitable and
natural. Indeed, Ayes is remembered more generally as perhaps the
first case rejecting the principle of comity to slave law.'' In Ayes,
Chief Justice Shaw freed a slave sojourning in Massachusetts. 112 In
doing so, he followed Lord Mansfield's position in Somerset's Case, that
slavery could not be enforced in the courts of a free state. 10 3 In mak-
ing that ruling, Shaw also remarked that slavery was against both "nat-
ural right" and "the fundamental laws of this State," ' 4 and "wholly
repugnant to our laws." 0 5 Responding to the choice-of-law argument
that a traveler's personal property was protected by domiciliary law,
and should not be stripped at the place of sojourn, Shaw in effect
reached the merits and roundly rejected the view that there could be
"property" in human beings.' 0 6
97. Reports even of federal cases having to do with the fugitive slave problem are quite
sparse through the 1830s. These includeJohnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 855 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1833) (No. 7416) (reversing an award of penalties for obstruction of a recapture); Hill
v. Low, 12 F. Cas. 172, 173 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1822) (No. 6494) (reversing because incitement to
escape is not obstruction of arrest); In re Susan, 23 F. Cas. 444, 445-48 (C.C.D. Ind. 1818)
(No. 13,632) (holding for the first time that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitu-
tional; also holding that the proceeding provided is summary, and that state laws are
immaterial).
98. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
99. See supra note 36.
100. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 219 (1836) (Shaw, C.J.). In fact, ChiefJustice Tilghman of
Pennsylvania drew this distinction even earlier in Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 62, 63-
64 (Pa. 1819), and Commonwealth ex rel. Negro Lewis v. Holloway, 6 Binn. 213, 217-18 (Pa.
1814). See also the opinion of Justice Bushrod Washington to the same effect in Butler v.
Hopper, 4 F. Cas. 904, 905 (C.D.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 2241), cited in Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at
221.
101. Earlier cases outside Massachusetts are noted in LEw, supra note 37, at 62-71.
102. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 225.
103. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 509 (K.B. 1772) (Mansfield, C.J.).
104. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 217.
105. Id. at 218.
106. Id. at 216. A slave state until 1846, New Jersey rejected these "higher law" remarks
in State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 376-77 (1845). See Act of Apr. 17, 1846, ch. 3, 1846 N.J. Laws
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The distinction between a fugitive slave and a slave brought vol-
untarily into a free state, in some cases, might have been more techni-
cal than real, signifying only that the slave had made her escape while
sojourning in the north rather than from her home in the south.
Somerset, too, had been brought voluntarily to England and only
then had run away. But in some cases there was no "escape" of any
kind. There was simply a stay in the free state, and in such cases the
sojourning slave was commonly supposed to have become free. It was
a rather metaphysical question just why the slave did become free.
Take Somerset, for example. Was Somerset freed only because there
was no slave law in England, or was he freed, as Joseph Story seems to
have thought, because he had set foot on free soil and breathed free
air?
10 7
In this middle period, then, northern courts began to apply their
own laws to free a slave even on shorter sojourns in the state, as long
as the slave was there with the owner's consent1' Volenti non fit in-
juria. But the arresting feature of this second period is that some
southern courts continued for a time to extend comity unilaterally,
53 (abolishing slavery). Cf Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 512-13 (1841) (Bald-
win,J.) ("As each state has plenary power to legislative on this subject, its laws are the test
of what is property. .. ").
107. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lemmon v. People ex rel.
Napoleon, 20 N.Y. 562, 605 (1860) ("The idea was ... fixed in the public mind by a striking
metaphor which attributed to the atmosphere of the British Islands a quality which caused
the shackles of the slave to fall off."). This may have been a reference to lines of Cowper,
quoted in LEW, supra note 37, at 67:
Slaves cannot breathe in England; if their lungs
Receive our air, that moment they are free,
They touch our country, and their shackles fall.
See also Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622 (1856). The court stated:
[B]ut the [northwest] ordinance ofJuly 13, 1787, for the government of the terri-
tory northwest of the river Ohio, prohibits, in express terms, [slavery's] introduc-
tion here for any purpose whatever. By its imperative language it is denied any
vitality on our soil. Its manacles instantly break asunder and crumble to dust,
when he who has worn them.., is afforded the opportunity ... of placing his feet
upon our shore, and of breathing the air of freedom.
Id. at 630.
Interestingly, Pennsylvania, concerned that delegates would stay away from the Consti-
tutional Convention for fear of losing their slave "property," enacted special protective
laws. Soifer, supra note 50, at 1918-19 n.10.
108. Aves's Case is the classic example. Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193
(1836); see also Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 49 (1837) (freeing a slave who had
sojourned two years temporarily in the state, but distinguishing the case of a slave solely in
transit); Daggs v. Frazer, 6 F. Cas. 1112-13 (D. Iowa 1849) (No. 3583) (dismissing an action
in trover by a citizen of Missouri for the return of nine slaves lost on a visit to Iowa because
trover would not lie in Iowa for the return of slaves). For antebellum discussion of the
master's right of transit, see THOMAS COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 135-40 (1858).
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applying northern state law to free a slave. The principle was, "Once
free always free.""0 9 This happened, to take the most prominent late
example, in the Missouri trial court in the first litigation in Dred
Scott's case. Because Scott had been taken voluntarily to a free state
and to a free territory, and had resided in each for a considerable
time, he argued that he had become free by operation of their respec-
tive laws, and the Missouri trial court so held.110
Such one-way choices of liberating law suggest the emergence in
this middle period of what the late Professor Ehrenzweig would have
called "a true rule."'11 Ehrenzweig might have called it, by analogy to
his "rule of validation," a "rule of liberation."" 2 A rule of liberation
could almost be said to have been typical until perhaps the 1850s,111
when the national agony was becoming too acute for such
forbearance.
Now, antebellum judges knew, as the legal realists reminded us,
that the forum does not actually escape its law, whatever it purports to
be doing.114 Its evasions, as much as its narrowing constructions, al-
ways reflect or become what forum law actually is. Yet it would be
fatuous for us today to look back upon a southern court applying lib-
erating northern law and to say to it: "You do seem to see that slavery
is 'odious.' Abhorrence of slavery, then, is your true policy. This true
policy is probably captured in declarations of liberty in your own case
law. Instead of making intellectually dishonest departures from the
laws so regrettably maintaining slavery in your state, you should de-
109. See, e.g., Fenwick v. Chapman, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 461, 465 (1835); see also Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 560 (1856) (McLeanJ, dissenting) ("In . . . Spencer v.
Negro Dennis, [8 Gill 314, 321 (Md. 1849)] the court say: 'Once free, and always free, is
the maxim of Maryland law upon the subject .... '").
110. The case is unreported. See Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 387, 395 (1852) (reversing
the trial court's ruling in Scott's favor).
111. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law, Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 CAL. L.
REv. 240, 241 (1961) (identifying "true rules" of choice of law reliably predictive of actual
outcomes in a way formal rules might not be).
112. ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw § 65 n.169 (1967); ALBERT A.
EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 465 (1962) (identifying a true "rule of
validation" for contract cases more reliably predictive of actual outcomes than the rule of
the "place of making").
113. Between 1824 and 1852, when the Missouri Supreme Court decided Scott v. Emer-
son, 15 Mo. 387 (1852), Missouri cases had held that taking a slave into a free territory, at
least when there had been an intention to establish a permanent residence there, freed the
slave. Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 259 (1824), seems to be the first such reported Missouri
decision. See also, e.g., Wilson v. Melvin, 4 Mo. 347, 351 (1837). Later Missouri cases fol-
lowed Emerson. See, e.g., Sylvia v. Kirby, 17 Mo. 434, 435 (1853).
114. See, e.g., Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622, 656 (1856) (Swan,J., concurring)
(explaining that the forum, in choosing foreign law, makes that law its own municipal law).
This was the view of Joseph Story. See STORY, supra note 67, ch. II, § 23.
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clare property in slaves a nullity in your courts, under principles of
national policy found in the Declaration and Ordinance, or on state
common law principles." Such reasoning was scarcely to be imagined
in southern courts then, if only because a southern state's economy
would have been too profoundly invested in slavery for a judicial coup
de main to have had any efficacy. However clear might have been the
requirements ofjustice in the individual case, the requirements of the
situation as a whole would have seemed altogether different to a
southern judge then. The rights of property, the needs of public
safety, considerations of the welfare of aged or infirm black depen-
dents, and the want of constitutional principle to the contrary, all
seemed to fix the slave system irrevocably upon the state. The best,
then, that southern courts could do with slavery in this second ante-
bellum period was to depart from their own "odious" laws whenever it
was possible to choose liberating law instead-leaving their own laws
ostensibly undisturbed.
C. The Final Phase: Polarization
Now we come to the third, last chapter in the story. As the south
saw the balance of power tilting away, it increasingly resented the rhet-
oric of the north, implicitly one of both moral reproach and incite-
ment to slave revolt. Southern rhetoric underwent a change. The
people of the south had reconsidered the entire position, as one
southern judge put it, and now the whole people were of one mind:
the white master's utter dominion over the black slave, even when vio-
lent and cruel, 115 was ordained by God. 1 6
The Supreme Court of Mississippi waited until 1859 to declare its
"settled conviction," in Mitchell v. Wells,117 "that the interests of both
115. This Calhoun-like position can be seen in Joseph H. Lumpkin, Report on Law Re-
form, I U.S. MONTHLY L. MAG. 68, 77-78 (1850) ("If duty to ourselves, as well as to our
slaves, requires increased severity, by way of security, let it be imposed, regardless of the
hypocritical cant and clamor of the fanatics of our own or other countries.").
116. See ic ("The conscience of the whole south, after having been thoroughly aroused
to the most earnest and intense investigation of this subject by the merciless and unremit-
ting assaults of our relentless foes, have become thoroughly satisfied that this institution-
like government itself-is of God."). This and other expressions of Georgia's point of view
are discussed in Reid, supra note 7, at 624.
117. 37 Miss. 235 (1859). See the notorious remarks of Justice Harris:
The State of Ohio, forgetful of her constitutional obligations . . . and afflicted
with a negro-mania,... inclines.., to her embrace, as citizens, the neglected race
.... Suppose that Ohio, still further afflicted with her peculiar philanthropy,
should.., claim to confer citizenship on the chimpanzee .... are we to be told
that "comity" will require of the States not thus demented,.. . to meet the necessi-
ties of the mongrel race thus ... introduced into . . . this confederacy?
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races are best promoted by the institution of slavery as it exists
amongst us.""" So saying, the court abruptly veered away from its
former accommodating course of decision119 and held that a manu-
mission effected in Ohio was ineffective in Mississippi.' 2 ° In Wells, the
former slave was the daughter of her master. She had been taken to
Ohio and freed there by her father. The Mississippi court held her a
slave again, denying her rights to inherit any of her father's property
in Mississippi, notwithstanding the "will of the master" to the
contrary.'
2 1
The Georgia Supreme Court abandoned comity and liberty in an
1855 case, denying freedom to a former slave who had been manumit-
ted in Maryland. 122 Georgia's peppery Chief Justice Lumpkin insisted
on this sharp departure from pre-existing law: "This whole question is
one of State policy, and should not be put upon these principles of
meum et tuum .... No one pretends that negroes can be carried to
New York . .. and held there in perpetual bondage .... With what
more propriety can slaves be brought here and emancipated?" 2 1 In
another case, while in fact ordering manumission, Lumpkin pro-
tested: "For myself, I utterly repudiate the whole current of decisions,
English and Northern, from Somerset's case down to the present time,
which hold that the bare removal of a slave to a free country ... will
give freedom to the slave. 1 24
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, too, took a sudden turn toward
forum law in its "in transit" cases. As late as 1848, Kentucky was still
following its earlier cases in recognizing the free status of a former
slave who had lived in Ohio for two years.1 21 Within a year, however,
Id. at 262-64 (Harris, J.). But see id at 282 (Handy, J., dissenting) (complaining that the
court was adopting "barbarian rules which prevailed in the dark ages").
118. Mitchel, 37 Miss. at 238.
119. See Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246, 321 (1858) (holding that, although manumitted
blacks could not enter or leave Mississippi, in another state they could take a pecuniary
legacy of property originating in Mississippi); see also id. at 273 (distinguishing Hinds v.
Brazealle, 2 Miss. (2 Howard) 837, 842-44 (1838)). Hinds involved a master's return to the
slave state with his manumitted slave after a brief departure for the sole purpose of
manumitting the slave, thus working a "fraud on the law," which disqualified the black
devisee from taking.
120. Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 264.
121. Id. at 257 (treating a recent statute to the same effect as indicative of state policy,
which it declared in strong terms).
122. See Knight v. Hardeman, 17 Ga. 253 (1855).
123. Id. at 262-63.
124. Cleland v. Waters, 19 Ga. 35, 41-42 (1854); see also Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 567-71
(1851) (suggesting that Somerset's Case abolished all slavery in England, but had no applica-
tion in the United States).
125. See Davis v. Tingle, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 539, 54548 (1848).
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the Kentucky court made a sudden about-face and insisted on its sov-
ereign power to support the institutions of slavery within its own terri-
tory.126 Even more strikingly, in another case the Kentucky court re-
enslaved a black who had been declared free in a judicial proceeding
in habeas corpus in Pennsylvania. 127
In this third, final chapter in the antebellum story, southern
courts become more intransigent. 128 The best-known example of this
hardening of southern judicial attitudes is seen in the dramatic about-
face of the Missouri Supreme Court in the original state court litiga-
tion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.129 Under its existing precedents, as we
have seen, Missouri would have recognized Scott's freedom, based on
his master's long voluntary sojourn with him on free soil. Now, how-
ever, the state court took a very different view:
Times are not now as they were when the former decisions
on this subject were made. Since then not only individuals
but States have been possessed with a dark and fell spirit in
relation to slavery, whose gratification is sought in the pur-
suit of measures, whose inevitable consequences must be the
overthrow and destruction of our government. Under such
circumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to
show the least countenance to any measure which might
gratify this spirit.13 °
So Missouri changed the ground rules in the middle of Scott's case,
suddenly jettisoning its former conflicts rule of comity and the princi-
ple of "Once free, always free." Scott complained of this in the United
States Supreme Courtt 3 -quite fruitlessly, because under Strader v.
Graham,132 state laws on the status of slaves did not raise a federal
126. See Collins v. America, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 565, 571 (1849).
127. See Maria v. Kirby, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 542, 545 (1851) (holding that, the parties
being different, on the slave's return to Kentucky in a state of slavery rather than freedom
it was "as if he had not been absent"); see also id. at 551 (distinguishing a hypothetical case
in which the slave had been adjudicated free in a proceeding between the same parties in
the free state).
128. Nash, supra note 7, argues that Texas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, and
Arkansas, among seceding states, and Maryland, Kentucky, and Delaware, among other
slave states, could not legitimately be included in this generalization. See id. at 301-08.
Professor Finkelman takes the view that, by the outbreak of war, only Kentucky afforded
comity, and in the north, only the border state of Illinois afforded comity. See FINKELMAN,
supra note 7, at 11.
129. See Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 387, 395 (1852) (reversing the trial court, which had
followed earlier Missouri cases).
130. Id. at 394-95.
131. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 466 (1856) (Nelson, J., concur-
ring) ("But what court has not changed its opinions? Whatjudge has not changed his?").
132. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 81 (1850).
1344 [VOL. 56:1316
NIGHT-THOUGHTS OF A LEGAL REALIST
question."' Strader, indeed, was one of the linchpins of the Supreme
Court's policy in this dark time.
What were the northern courts doing in this third phase? As the
antebellum era was drawing to its disastrous end, the northern state
courts are supposed to have taken an increasingly strident, abolitionist
turn, thus joining the south in the flight from comity. But it needs to
be remembered that forum law was already the choice rule on liberty
in the north. The transit cases were an exception. What happened in
this third chapter of the story is that some northern courts did be-
come willing to free slaves even in brief transit. Eventually, abolition-
ist judges in some northern states would free slaves who were merely
passing through the state on the way to another. Lemmon v. People ex
rel. Napoleon' is the example usually given. In that 1860 case, a slave
was held liberated, although the master was not visiting the state in
any real sense, but merely waiting between ships. An alarmed group
of New York businessmen raised a compensatory fund of $5000 for the
southerner so unexpectedly deprived of his "property.
' 1 5
Similarly, in Anderson v. Poindexter,16 the Ohio court ruled that
Poindexter had become a free man simply by having been sent on an
errand in Ohio by his Kentucky master."3 7
One should not underestimate the importance of the northern
shift from comity in the "transit" cases. It meant that a southern slave-
owner in effect was losing what today we would call the right to travel,
at least the right to travel accompanied by slaves. 1
3 8
VI. CONFLICT OVER THE KIDNAP AND RESCUE OF FUGITWES
There is an even more dramatic story of sectional conflict in
those northern state courts that, at last, hauling out the big constitu-
tional guns, resisted the return even of fugitive slaves, and refused to
punish slave rescuers. The first key to the fugitive cases is that the
internal domestic policy conflict in northern courts was fracturing.
The polar, proliberty position was to be seen, for the most part, in state
133. Id. at 93 (holding that the status of a slave was up to each state in its own courts).
134. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
135. After the initial hearing in Lemmon, New York businessmen reportedly contributed
to a fund raised by the New York Journal of Commerce to compensate the master in that
case. See FINKELtMAN, supra note 7, at 297.
136. 6 Ohio St. 475 (1856).
137. Id. at 482.
138. This was argued in Lemmon. 20 N.Y. at 580. For this reason, it is not unlikely that
had the Supreme Court reviewed Lemmon it would have built upon Dred Scott to force legi-
timization of slavery upon the free states. For this argument, see JAMES M. MCPHERSON,
BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CwL WtAR ERA 179-81 (1988).
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courts in the north, while fidelity to an imagined "greater good," and
comity to the south's proslavery concerns, found expression largely in
northern federal courts.13 9 It was the state courts in the north that
were more likely to try to free alleged fugitives. But even in federal
courts, the judges could not always control the sympathies of northern
juries.
In these fugitive cases, then, the nation ultimately weighed in,
much more strongly than in the past, on the side of the slave interest.
To be sure, courts had always tended to see the enforcement of fed-
eral fugitive slave law as a constitutional duty, not so much because of
the Supremacy Clause as because of the Fugitive Slave Clause. But
federal judges, especially, were becoming increasingly frightened.
They came increasingly to believe that if they did not enforce the fugi-
tive slave law the Union would fall apart. It is certainly true that any
such dissolution would be disastrous. The Union would lose lands for
which it had paid millions; the midwest would lose its outlets to the
sea; and the north would become vulnerable to hostile penetration
from the foreign friends of the south, unless-and this was the most
awful alternative-the north launched a fratricidal war to suppress
rebellion.
I have said that, with the nation more clearly taking one side in
the sectional dispute, the internal policy conflict in each northern
state fractured, with federal courts in the north aligned in favor of
comity to southern interests, and state courts in the north increasingly
determined to resist slavery, in favor of human rights. Here, too, the
story differs in one respect from other current tellings. Once one
moves beyond the transit cases and brings the fugitive cases into the
picture, it appears that a few northern judges-the federal judges-
became more appeasing rather than more intransigent. For them,
comity remained important.
The best point of entry into this thicket is probably the Supreme
Court's 1842 decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania. 40 In Prigg, Justice Story
read the Fugitive Slave Clause, as Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts
139. There were some successful enforcement efforts also in some northern state courts.
See, e.g., Ex pane Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77, 199, 200 (1859) (sustaining the conviction of a
slave rescuer under the Fugitive Slave Act). On the whole, presidential appointments to
the federal courts tended to be sympathetic to southern views throughout the antebellum
period.
140. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 345 (1842). For current discussion, see generally Paul Finkelman,
Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Judicial Na-
tionalism, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 247 (1994) [hereinafter Finkelman, Story Telling]; Paul
Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605 (1993); Holden-Smith,
supra note 18.
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had read it in Aves,' 1 as a crucial compromise without which the
south would never have ratified the Constitution. 142 It is sometimes
said today that the Fugitive Slave Clause was more of a technical after-
thought than the crucial compromise Justice Story supposed-some
say invented 143 -in Prigg.14 4 The Clause was reported out by the Com-
mittee of Detail after the rest of Article IV was drafted, and was voted
unanimously with little debate.145 Although the "crucial" compromise
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
142. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 395.
143. See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 6, at 21; Finkelman, Story Telling, supra note 140,
at 256; Wiecek, supra note 43, at 136. There is no discussion of the Clause in The Federalist
Papers.
144. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 711. Prigg relied on an earlier emphatic expression of
this "crucial compromise" thesis by ChiefJustice Shaw of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v.
Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 220-21 (1836). There are even earlier judicial expressions of
the position. See, e.g., Wright v. Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle, 62, 63 (Pa. 1819) (Tilghman,
C.J.) ("[I]t is well known that our southern brethren would not have consented to become
parties to a Constitution under which the United States have enjoyed so much prosperity,
unless their property in slaves had been secured.").
145. Although there was profound concern at the Convention that the south be pro-
tected from the abolitionist tendencies it feared from a strong central government, it is
unlikely that there was a constitutional compromise over fugitive slaves, if only because it
would not have been necessary. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 428 (McLean, J., dissenting)
(arguing that from a very early period fugitives from labor were delivered up by the colo-
nies in a spirit of comity); see also Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77, 268 (1859) (Sutliff, J.,
dissenting):
For more than a hundred years immediately preceding the adoption of the con-
stitution, the colonies and states had respectively exercised and received offices of
kindness by comity in relation to the recapture and restoration of fugitive servants
and apprentices, in a manner perfectly satisfactory to each other, and to the citi-
zens of each. At least there is no evidence of any complaint having been made to
the contrary, either at the formation of the articles of confederation, or in the
constitutional convention.
Id.
On August 28, the Committee of Detail reported out a clause providing for the surren-
der of fugitives from justice. SeeJAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787, at 545 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966). Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney
of South Carolina then moved that the states also be required to surrender fugitive slaves.
Roger Sherman of Connecticut remarked drily that it was no more proper to seize a slave
in public than a horse. Id at 546. Butler withdrew his motion, but renewed it the next day,
and it was agreed without discussion or vote. Id. at 552. Neither at the Philadelphia Con-
vention nor in the state ratification conventions does there seem to have been any mention
of the Clause as an element of a constitutional compromise. COVER, supra note 7, at 88,
found support for the "crucial compromise" thesis in remarks made in the period of ratifi-
cation. See Report of the North Carolina Delegates to Governor Caswell, reprinted in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 83-84 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) ("The
southern States have also a much better Security for the return of Slaves who might en-
deavor to Escape than they had under the original Confederation."); Speech of Charles
Pinckney in the South Carolina House of Representatives (1788), reprinted in id. at 255, 256
(to same effect); remarks of James Madison in the Debate in the Virginia Convention
(1788), reprinted in id. at 325 (same); see alsoJONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
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theory of the Fugitive Slave Clause is widely accepted now, it might
well be argued that the northern states would never have joined the
Union if it had entailed giving Congress power to authorize what was
in fact done in the fugitive slave laws. 46
Prigg is generally remembered as holding both that the states
could not impose protective procedures upon the enforcement of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, and that federal officials could not re-
quire-we would say, "commandeer"147 -state officials to assist in en-
forcing it. 4 ' There was, however, a third prong. In the course of his
murky opinion for the Prigg Court, Justice Story also declared that the
Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV was self-executing. It directly au-
CONSTITUTION 453 (1836). But a fair reading of these remarks shows only that the advan-
tage of the Fugitive Slave Clause to the south became a point in the Constitution's favor,
not that it embodied a crucial compromise. But see Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335
(C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9583). Justice McLean, sitting on circuit, stated:
I am aware it has been stated, that the subject of slavery was not discussed in the
convention, and that the reclamation of fugitives from labor was not, at that time,
a subject of much interest. This is a mistake. It was a subject of deep and exciting
interest, and without a provision on the subject no constitution could have been
adopted. I speak from information received from the late Chief Justice Marshall
Id. at 338.
Article IV contains no explicit mention of power in Congress over fugitive slaves. Cf
Bushnell 9 Ohio St. at 228 (Brinkerhoff, J., dissenting):
[A]s early as 1828, in American Insurance Company v. Canter, the Supreme
Court of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall delivering its opinion, unani-
mously decided that in the territories Congress rightfully exercises the "combined
powers of a general and of a state government." Yet, in the recent case of Dred
Scott v. Sandford, all this is overturned and disregarded, and the whole past the-
ory and practice of the government in this respect attempted to be revolutionized
by force of a judicial ipse dixit. We are thus invited by that court back to the
consideration of first principles; and neither it nor those who rely on its authority
have a right to complain if we accept the invitation [i.e., to strike down the Fugi-
tive Slave Act].
Id. (citing American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 388 (1828); Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)).
146. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 127-28 (1854) (Smith, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom.
Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858); infra text accompanying note 199.
147. Cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) ("Either
type of federal action would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal
regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's divi-
sion of authority between federal and state governments." (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981), to the effect that Congress
may not "commandee [r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program")).
148. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625-26 (holding that Pennsylvania could not regulate
claims for fugitive slaves); id. at 622 (indicating that state magistrates may assist in slave
recapture and rendition "unless prohibited" by state law). The Prigg Court also held the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 to be well within the power of Congress, id. at 618-19, but the
Court did not otherwise pass on the constitutionality of the Act.
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thorized private, as well as federal governmental, action. The Clause,
Story insisted, gave slaveowners a right of self-help-"recaption. ''149
And neither the state nor the nation could interfere with it.
In other words, after Prigg, a slaveowner had a constitutional right
to enter a free state and capture and remove an alleged slave. If any
mistakes were made, of course, the state was free to impose civil and
criminal liabilities on a kidnapper. But Prigg reversed the north's pre-
sumption of freedom and projected into the north the south's racial
presumption of bondage. Prigg put terribly at risk all blacks living in
the north, legitimating raids into the north by parties of "slave-
catchers."15 °
In northern streets, and in northern state courts as well,'51 there
had long been resistance to recaptures of alleged escaped slaves,
whether attempted by warrant under the fugitive slave laws or not.
Indeed, such resistance, coupled with the sparseness of federal deten-
tion facilities and courts, had rendered the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793152 substantially ineffective. The enactment of the harsh new Fu-
gitive Slave Act of 1850,153 however, plunged northern courts into tur-
moil. It is terrible to contemplate that, as the Union threatened to fall
apart, the rendition of fugitive slaves came to be seen as vital national
policy. 54 It is true that state courts in the north did resist this alleged
national policy. There was intransigence there. In contrast, in north-
149. Id. at 612-14; see also Commonwealth v. Griffith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 11, 18 (1823) (to
similar effect).
150. Prigg can hardly be called the "triumph of liberty" Justice Story always insisted it
had been. Presumably Story referred to the fact that Prigg denied the resources of unwill-
ing states to enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. Yet it is reported that after Prigg was
decided, Story wrote a member of Congress proposing, for better enforcement of the Fugi-
tive Slave Act, that federal officials be commissioned in each county, and enclosing a draft
bill; this suggestion was adopted by Congress in the harsh new Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.
The story is told in KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, STATESMAN OF
THE OLD REPUBLIC 126 (1985); Finkelman, Story Telling, supra note 140.
151. After Chief Justice Shaw's decision, for example, in Morris v. Eldridge, reported in
the Daily Evening Transcript, Aug. 1, 1836, freeing the slaves there claimed, the claimant's
agent inquired about obtaining a fresh warrant, as if to re-seize the freedwomen in open
court. See LEVY, supra note 37, at 73-76. The freedwomen were advised to "clear out before
the agent got them again." Id. at 75. Then the mob of spectators, white and black, chant-
ing, "Go, go!" surged out of the courtroom husting out the freedwomen. Id. Shaw called
out, "Stop, stop," but the freedwomen were muscled into a carriage outside and driven
away, chased by a hastily appointed but ineffectual posse. Id. at 75-76.
152. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, §§ 3,4, 1 Star. 302, repealed by Act of June 28, 1864, ch.
166, 13 Stat. 200.
153. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Star. 462, repealed by Act ofJune 28, 1864, ch. 166, 13
Stat. 200.
154. The numbers suggest that the problem of fugitive slaves was not very great, and
enforcement of the fugitive slave laws not very effective. There were some 4 million slaves
in the south on the eve of the Civil War. FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 27 n.24, says that the
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ern federal courts we find almost hysterical efforts to placate southern
opinion and overcome local passion.
Part of the Compromise of 1850,155 the second Fugitive Slave
Act 156 was a drastic attempt to make fugitive slave law effective. The
Act authorized massive federal assistance to slave-catchers in the north
and made a federal commissioner available in every county for the
first time, as a justice of the peace,1 57 with powers to arrest, im-
prison, t1 8 issue process, appoint persons to execute process, and or-
der rendition of fugitive slaves-a jurisdiction concurrent with that of
the federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals.1 59 The com-
missioners earned a fee of $10 for every rendition,16 ° but only $5 for
an unsuccessful rendition proceeding. They could command the obe-
dience of the U.S. marshals and deputies,' under penalties of $1000
for refusal to obey and the full value of the slaves' services for permit-
ting any to escape while in federal custody. 6 ' In addition, the com-
missioners were empowered "to summon . . . to their aid the
bystanders, or posse comitatus."'63 The Act commanded "all good citi-
zens.., to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this
law."' 64 The expenses of the slave hunt were to be borne by the fed-
eral treasury. 1 5 The Act authorized a pursuer to reclaim a fugitive
either by warrant and arrest, or by seizure and prompt present-
ment.166 The presiding judge or commissioner was authorized to
hear a rendition "in a summary manner."' 67 All that would be re-
quired was an affidavit or certificate under seal stating that the claim-
ant was entitled to the labor of the stated fugitive, together with
similar "proof' of the identity of the alleged fugitive. 168 These proofs
1850 census reported 1011 runaway slaves; CAMPBELL, supra note 81, at 207, says that 298
fugitives were returned in eleven years.
155. California came into the Union as a free state; certain territories were opened to
slavery, and the public sale of slaves was prohibited in the District of Columbia. See CAMe-
BELL, supra note 81, at 3.
156. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, 463-65, repealed by Act ofJune 28, 1864, ch.
166, 13 Stat. 200.
157. Id. § 1.
158. Id,
159. Id. § 5.
160. Id. § 8.
161. Id. § 5.
162. Id,
163. Id.
164. Id. The commissioner could appoint all personnel necessary to such pursuit. Id.
165. Id. § 9.
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conclusively authorized the claimant to seize and remove the fugitive
from the state.169 As for an alleged fugitive's right to be heard, the
Act is explicit: "In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testi-
mony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence .... ,170 Yet
even with this blanket denial of hearing or appeal, court cases
emerged in the wreckage anyway. Habeas corpus cases turned up in
state and federal courts;' 7' state courts convicted U.S. marshals for
trespass or assault or kidnapping; federal courts issued writs of habeas
corpus against rescuers, or prosecuted or tried them for statutory
penalties. 172
The Act required courts and commissioners to set aside the basic
procedural protections of liberty guaranteed by the common law, pro-
tections we would locate today in the Bill of Rights. Yet such had been
the leadership of the Supreme Court on the fugitive slave laws that it
seems to have been obscure to the eyes of some of the lawyers occa-
sionally involved in fugitive slave cases that those laws were unconstitu-
tional. Surely at least the Fifth Amendment might have had some
bearing. The young lawyer, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., for example,
already famous for his Two Years Before the Mast,1 73 and a passionate
abolitionist, intruded himself into an ongoing rendition proceeding
in Boston, and argued to the federal commissioner as an amicus that
rendition without a hearing was not in accordance with law. 174 But he
did not mention the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
175
In one case, Massachusetts's Chief Justice Shaw impatiently brushed
169. Id.
170. I&
171. For an interesting discussion of federal habeas corpus in fugitive slave cases, see
Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
172. Under section 7 of the Act, criminal and civil penalties and damages were imposed
for knowingly obstructing capture of the fugitive, attempting rescue, or aiding or abetting.
See, e.g., Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 327 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307) (awarding
$2850 in statutory damages for harboring fugitive slaves from Kentucky in violation of the
Fugitive Slave Act).
173. RIcHARD H. DANA, JR., Two YEARs BEFORE THE MAST: A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF
LIRE AT SEA (1840).
174. This was the rendition of Anthony Bums, discussed in Finkelman, supra note 5. See
also infra note 187 and accompanying text.
175. See Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1810 (providing an account of Dana's arguments).
In In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13 (1854), rev'd sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506
(1858), the Wisconsin court did declare the 1850 Act unconstitutional, striking it down,
among other things, under the Fifth Amendment, for want of provisions for notice and a
hearing. Id. at 67-69. For the various arguments in the colloquy among the Wisconsin
judges in In re Booth, see id. at 36, 40-43, 64-70 (Smith, J.), and id. at 82-84 (Crawford, J.,
dissenting). For a good current presentation of the In re Booth saga, see Jenni Parrish, The
Booth Cases: Final Step to the Civil War, 29 WILLAMETTrE L. REv. 237 (1993).
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aside the suggestion that it was not due process to deny a recaptured
fugitive a hearing with the conclusory remark that Congress had pro-
vided an administrative, not a judicial, process.1 76
Enforcement of the Act required subordination of humane feel-
ings. As Ohio's Supreme Court Judge Brinkerhoff complained, the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 disregarded "the instinctive virtues of hu-
manity. ' 177 Supreme CourtJustice Baldwin, sitting on circuit, warned
a federal jury in Pennsylvania not to allow their humane feelings to
blind them to their duty:
The only permanent danger is in the indulgence of the hu-
mane and benevolent feelings of our nature, at what we feel
to be acts of oppression towards human beings endowed
Ohio's Judge Brinkerhoff, dissenting in Ex parte Bushnell 9 Ohio St. 62, 177 (1859)
(Brinkerhoff, J., dissenting), pointed out that slaves seized under the 1850 Act were de-
prived of liberty without due process of law. Id, at 221-23; see also id. at 246 (Sutliff, J.,
dissenting); In re Charge to Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F. Cas. 1007 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1851) (No. 18,261). Responding to the due process argument of counsel in Miller v. Mc-
Querny, 17 F. Cas. 335 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9583), the federal court, in an opinion by
"the Court," took the optimistic view that process might be afforded in the southern state
after rendition:
That right [liberty] when presented to a court in a slave state, has, generally, been
acted upon with fairness and impartiality.... The claim to freedom, if made, in
the slave state, would be unaffected by the preliminary inquiry and decision....
It is true .... that the power of the master may... defeat a trial for the freedom of
the fugitive. This must be admitted, but the hardship and injustice supposed
arises out of the institution of slavery, over which we have no control.... [We]
can not be held answerable.
Id. at 340.
176. See LEw, supra note 37, at 100; Sims's Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285, 303 (1851).
ChiefJustice Shaw was probably the most prestigious state judge of the nineteenth century;
but in Sims's Case, Shaw became the first judge to write a full-dress opinion upholding the
hated Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Sims's Case, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 308-09 (upholding the
Act on the authority of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 345, 402 (1842), which had
sustained the constitutionality of the 1793 Act). Shaw also disregarded Massachusetts's
1837 "personal liberty law" because it conflicted with the Act. See the account of The La-
timer Case, 5 LAW REP. 481, 483-84 (1843) (Shaw, C.J.) (sitting as single justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts). Shaw also refused, no doubt correctly, to issue
a writ of habeas corpus against the U.S. marshal in Shadrach Wilkins's case. See infra notes
184-186 and accompanying text. Richard Henry Dana writes of this, "The Ch. Justice read
the petition, & said, in a most ungracious manner-'This won't do. I can't do anything on
this,' & laid it upon the table & turned away, to engage in something else.... I asked him
to be so good as to tell me what the defects were .... He . . . attempted to bluff me off
.... " Entry for Feb. 15, 1851, in 2 THEJOURNAL OF RICHARD HENRY DANA, JR. 411-412, 424
(R. Lucid ed., 1968). Nevertheless, no fugitive slave had been returned from Boston as late
as 1852. See Leonard W. Levy, Sims' Case: The Fugitive Slave Law in Boston in 1851, in JUDG-
MENTS, EssAYs ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 292 (1972). Rufus Choate is re-
ported to have remarked of Shaw, "I always approach Judge Shaw as a savage approaches
his fetish, knowing that he is ugly, but feeling that he is great." VAN WYCK BROOKs, THE
FLOWERING OF NEW ENGLAND, 1815-1865, at 325 (rev. ed. 1937).
177. Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. at 182 (Brinkerhoff, J., dissenting).
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with the same qualities and attributes as ourselves, and
brought into being by the same power which created us all;
without reflecting that in suffering these feelings to come
into action against rights secured by the laws, we forget the
first duty of citizens of a government of laws: obedience to
its ordinances. 78
The conflict of policies, then, became acute. In northern courts
there was enormous pressure to deliver up fugitive slaves under the
Act. At the same time, it was almost impossible for them to do so.
There had long been public resistance in the north to the "slave-catch-
ing" authorized by Prigg v. Pennsylvania;'79 now, after the 1850 Act,
with the force and treasury of the nation placed behind the slave-
catcher, there was rioting across the north. Abolitionists formed mobs
to effect rescue.18 0 Federal prosecutors charged some would-be rescu-
ers with treason (the penalty for treason being death), but that only
made it harder to obtain a conviction.8 1 Northern federal judges
struggled to persuade grand juries to indict. Justice Nelson, sitting on
circuit, charged a federal grand jury:
If any one supposes that this Union can be preserved, after a
material provision of the fundamental law upon which it
rests is broken and thrown to the wind by one section of it-
a provision in which nearly one-half of the states composing
it are deeply and seriously interested-he is laboring under a
delusion which the sooner he gets rid of the better.18 2
As if to emphasize the conflict of northern policies, northern fed-
eral courts became scenes of riot. In Massachusetts the new fugitive
slave law was received with particular resentment."8 3 Shortly after en-
178. Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 844 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7416). Thejury
eventually awarded $4000 in damages for obstructing the arrest of the plaintiffs slave. Id.
at 855.
179. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 345 (1842).
180. Attempts of alleged owners to kidnap blacks in the north were not uncommonly
blocked by angry crowds. See Johnson, 13 F. Cas. at 852-53; see also Levy, supra note 176, at
290-97 (describing events in Boston after the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, including mass
meetings, rescue plots, a "treasonably violent" address by Wendell Phillips, and calls by
other antislavery leaders for "nullification" of the Act).
181. In one treason case, the Pennsylvania jurors would not convict the alleged conspir-
ators, black or white, in the murder of a Maryland slaveowner seeking rendition. The case
is described in Oliver v. Kauffman, 18 F. Cas. 657, 658-59 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 10,497).
See infra note 190.
182. In reCharge to GrandJury-Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F. Cas. 1007,1012 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1851) (No. 18,261) (Nelson, Circuit justice).
183. See, e.g., In reCharge To Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F. Cas. 1015, 1015, (D.
Mass. 1851) (No. 18,263) ("The fugitive slave law ... was received, in Massachusetts, with
almost universal regret and disapprobation. With not a few, it produced great excitement
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actment of the new Act, Shadrach Wilkins was arrested in Boston as a
fugitive slave and carried off to the federal courtrooms for examina-
tion before a commissioner. A mob broke into the courtroom, took
Wilkins by force from the U.S. marshal, and effected a rescue. 184 The
assistant U.S. attorney charged one of the rescuers not only with resist-
ance to enforcement, but also with the capital crime of treason.18 5
The district judge in that case alternately begged and bullied the
grand jury:
A wise man will reflect that evils, great evils, must exist
under every human government.... [I]f there be any, who,
• .. looking at our own government, its history and its hopes,
... can then desire its destruction, in the vain and desperate
hope of establishing a better in its stead, they must be inac-
cessible to reason or remonstrance, and of that unfortunate
class in whose minds judgment is dethroned, and monoma-
nia holds usurped dominion.
8 6
However strenuous the appeasing efforts of the federal judiciary,
the cases were few and often failed. In Boston, after the spectacle of
Anthony Burns187 in chains, paraded down State Street past outraged
crowds, buildings draped in black, and flags at half-mast, to the ship
that waited to take him back to Virginia,' 88 it became too difficult for
local authorities to lend courts and jails to rendition proceedings. No
further enforcements of the Fugitive Slave Act occurred there. In-
deed, it became impossible to prosecute rescuers there under the
Act.
1 89
and exasperation. Some openly avowed a determination to resist it by violence, declaring
that it was a matter of conscience not to permit it to be executed.").
184. See Levy, supra note 176, at 291.
185. See In re Charge to Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Law, 30 F. Cas. at 1015.
186. See id. at 1017. The outcome of the case is not reported.
187. See Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1793 (describing the Burns case as "the most famous
return of a fugitive slave in American history"). Professor Finkelman draws attention to an
ethical dilemma. See id. at 1818. It might have been better had the self-appointed Richard
Henry Dana not insisted on a hearing for Burns; Burns did not want one, convinced that
resistance to rendition on his part would bring down the wrath of his owner. See id. at
1812. The hearing was a failure, and Boston at last succeeded in achieving a formal rendi-
tion of a fugitive, to the gratification of much of the southern press. See id. at 1825. Four
months later, a group of Boston businessmen were able to buy Burns's freedom back for
$1300. See id. at 1820 n.150, 1829. Burns became a minister, see id. at 1814, and an author.
But Burns's health was broken; he had been kept shackled on the bare ground for the four
months, the punishment he had foreseen. See id. at 1829-30.
188. See LEW, supra note 37, at 106; Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1825.
189. See generallyJ. Morgan Kousser, "The Supremacy of Equal Rights": The Struggle Against
Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 941 (1988).
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While federal judges begged for convictions, in state courts an
active abolitionist spirit appeared in "fugitive" cases. Even before the
1850 Act, some state judges altogether abandoned the idea of ap-
peasement, giving the national enforcement effort only the most
transparent lip service.19 °
The most famous example of the struggle in the north between
federal judicial appeasement and state judicial resistance occurred in
the wake of a riot over the seizing of the alleged fugitive Joshua Glover
from his home in Racine, Wisconsin. 91 The disorderly public reac-
tion alarmed authorities, who locked up Glover in a Milwaukee jail
over the weekend to keep his case in statu quo.' 92 An enraged crowd
of his fellow Wisconsin citizens, black and white, freed Glover using a
battering ram, "the writ of 'open sesame.""9 " Glover was spirited away
to Canada by workers in the underground slave "railway," never to
reappear in the pages of history." 4 But now the real story of this case
begins. An organizer of the Racine riot and the Milwaukee rescue,
journalist Sherman Booth, was now arrested by a U.S. marshal for
prosecution under the 1850 Act. 95 Booth sought a writ of habeas
corpus from Justice Smith of the state supreme court, who struck
190. For a heavy dose of northern judicial insincerity, see, for example, Oliver v. Kauff-
man, 18 F. Cas. 657 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 10,497):
A worthy citizen of Maryland, in attempting to recapture a fugitive, was basely
murdered by a mob of negroes on the southern borders of our state .... That
this outrage was the... result of the [seditions] . .. taught by a few. . insane
fanatics, may be admitted. But by the great body of the people of Pennsylvania,
... an anxious desire was entertained that the perpetrators of this murder should
be brought to condign punishment. Measures were taken, even at the expense
of sending a large constabulary and military force into the neighborhood, to
arrest every person, black and white, on whom rested the least suspicion of partic-
ipation in the offence. A large number of bills of indictment were found against
the persons arrested for high treason, and one of them was tried in this court.
The trial was conducted by the attorney general of the state of Maryland; and
although it was abundantly evident that a riot and murder had been committed,
by some persons, the prosecution wholly failed in proving the defendant, on trial,
guilty of the crime of treason with which he was charged. But, however much it
was to be regretted that the perpetrators of this gross offence could not be
brought to punishment, the court and jury could not condemn, without proof,
any individual, to appease the justly offended feelings of the people of Maryland.
Unfortunately, a different opinion with regard to our duty in this matter, seems to
have been entertained by persons holding high official stations in that state ....
Id. at 658-59.
191. See Parrish, supra note 175, at 23942.
192. See id. at 240.
193. Id. at 241-42 (citing a contemporary news story, High-Handed Outrage! Attempt to
Kidnap a Citizen of Racine by Slave-Catchers, RACINE Anvoc., Mar. 20, 1854, at 1).




down the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as unconstitutional a96 and or-
dered the marshal to release Booth. 9 7 The full state supreme court
approved this order and ruling, one of the judges dissenting.1 98
In striking down the Fugitive Slave Act, the Wisconsin court made
a frontal assault on the "crucial compromise" theory:
Had the northern states imagined, that by assenting to this
clause of the constitution, they were thereby conferring
upon the federal government the power to enter their terri-
tory in pursuit of a runaway negro, and to employ the whole
military and naval force of the Union for that purpose, to
subject their houses to search, and to override their own laws
and municipal regulations, and that they were parting with
all power to regulate the mode of procedure by which that
clause was to be carried into effect; does any sane man be-
lieve that they would ever have assented to it? or, if the
southern states had imagined such a construction would be
put upon it, that they would ever have proposed it?' 99
The U.S. marshal complied with the writ and released Booth, but
the local assistant U.S. attorney obtained an indictment, and the mar-
shall re-arrested him.z°° Booth sought habeas corpus again, but this
time, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to intervene because the
federal prosecution was pending. 20' Booth was convicted of violating
the 1850 Act and was imprisoned.20 2
Now the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered Booth released from
custody, and this time did so unanimously.2 03 Thereupon the Attor-
ney General of the United States, Caleb Cushing, responding to the
starkness of this confrontation between the state and federal courts,
sought Supreme Court review204 of this case, and also of Wisconsin's
196. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 48-49 (1854), rev'd sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506 (1858).
197. Id. at 54. For a similar case in Ohio, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Ableman shortly after it was handed down, see Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 62 (1859).
198. In re Booth, 3 Wis. at 72 (Crawford, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 127-28 (1854) (Smith, J., concurring).
200. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 510.
201. SeeExparteBooth, 3 Wis. 134, 136 (1854), rev'd sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 506 (1858) (denying writ of habeas corpus upon Booth's post-indictment re-
arrest).
202. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 510.
203. In re Booth and Rycraft, 3 Wis. 144, 161, 172, 195 (1854) (seriatim) (granting writ
after convictions of Booth and another; ruling the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 unconstitu-
tional), rev'd sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858).
204. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 511-12.
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first judgment sustaining Justice Smith's initial order of release.2 °5
The Supreme Court granted review, consolidating the two cases. 2 06
At this point an almost surreal thing happened. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court instructed its clerk not to respond to the Supreme
Court's writ of certiorari, not to comply with the Court's request for a
certified copy of the record, and not to record the High Court's de-
mand.2 7 For some reason, the local assistant U.S. attorney in Milwau-
kee,J.R. Sharpstein, obtained a certified copy of the record before the
Wisconsin clerk was instructed to withhold it.2 08 After months of fu-
tile jockeying and a delay of years, the United States Supreme Court
went ahead and reviewed the case on the basis of Sharpstein's copy.20 9
The case, of course, was the famous case of Ableman v. Booth.210
In Ableman, the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Taney, ring-
ingly denied any power in the state courts to release those in federal
custody2 l or to block review in the United States Supreme Court.2 1 2
This is the position today.21 3 Taney, the erstwhile champion of states'
205. See Parrish, supra note 175, at 244.
206. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 513.
207. Id. at 512.
208. See Parrish, supra note 175, at 245.
209. See id. at 245-46.
210. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
211. Id. at 523; see also Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1871) (holding that
Wisconsin was without authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus for the discharge of an
enlisted soldier "mustered into the military service of the National government" and de-
tained by an officer of the United States for desertion).
212. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 517-25; cf Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)
(holding that the Supreme Court must have final say on the duties the Constitution im-
poses). The Court also conclusorily sustained the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave
Act. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 526.
213. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 412. It is sometimes argued that state courts had
long assumed and exercised these powers. See generally ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON
THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 154-198, 556-57 (2d
ed. 1876). Hurd notes:
It may be considered settled that state courts may grant the writ in all cases of
illegal confinement under the authority of the United States.
And the weight of authority clearly is that they may decide as to the legality of
the imprisonment; and discharge the prisoner if his detention be illegal though
the determination may involve questions of the constitutionality of acts of Con-
gress, or of the jurisdiction of a court of the United States.
Id. at 156; see also Michael Vitiello, The Power of State Legislatures to Subpoena Federal Officials,
58 TUL. L. REv. 548, 557 (1983) (arguing that the holding in Tarble's Case "flies in the face
of the rule . . . that state courts are empowered to enforce federal law concurrently with
federal courts so long as Congress did not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts").
The Suspension Clause is thought to protect state habeas corpus against suspension. See
WILLtAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 155 (1980) (arguing
that "the habeas clause was meant to restrict Congress from suspending state habeas for
federal prisoners except in certain cases where essential for public safety"); Dallin H. Oaks,
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rights, delivered a sweeping opinion, almost rivaling in the spacious-
ness and force of its conception of national power the early opinions
of ChiefJustice Marshall. But Taney's new-found nationalism has usu-
ally been read as disingenuous.2 14 Ableman is only the least indefen-
sible in a series of pro-south, proslavery decisions that included Dred
Scott v. Sandford2 15 and Prigg v. Pennsylvania.21 6 That is where the
Supreme Court was all this time,217 if you were looking for it, as the
country lurched toward its greatest disaster.
Some writers recently have argued that it was within the Court's
power even before the Civil War to reinterpret the Constitution and
free the slaves.218 In default of political leadership, early judicial lead-
ership might have made a difference. After all, slavery in the south as
well as the north had been much destabilized in the confusion of the
Revolution. During the war, slaves fought in exchange for freedom,
ran away, or went over to the British.219 It is true that after the war the
Habeas Corpus in the States- 776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 275 (1965) (noting that even
after Ableman, "southern courts persistently sustained state court jurisdiction" in habeas
corpus cases involving enlistees in the military). But once the return to the writ established
that the prisoner was held in federal custody, a state court's jurisdiction would be at an
end, and any further state proceedings would become coram non judice. See, e.g., Norris v:
Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 325 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307). See generally Charles Warren,
Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REV. 345 (1930).
214. Perhaps because Ableman is perceived as tarnished today for its appeasement of
proslavery interests, the later Tarble's Case, also arising in Wisconsin, In re Tarble, 25 Wis.
390 (1870), rev'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871), is commonly cited for the proposition that
ought to have been established by Ableman. See COVER, supra note 7, at 187 n.* ("It is as if
the unambiguous language of Booth could not be trusted because of its intimate connec-
tion with slavery and with the court that had rendered Dred Scott").
215. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449-52 (1856) (holding that Congress could not abolish
slavery in the territories because to do so would be to take property from slaveowners
without due process of law; thus, the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional
wherever it abolished slavery). Dred Scott also held that blacks were not citizens of the
United States, and therefore could not be citizens of a state within the meaning of the
federal diversity jurisdictional grant. Id. at 406; see also id. at 407 (declaring that negroes
were "unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior .... that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect").
216. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 345 (1842); see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
217. But see, e.g., Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109-10 (1860) (holding
that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to issue a mandamus to compel a state governor
to make rendition of a fugitive from justice). In Dennison, the alleged crime was helping a
slave escape from Kentucky to Ohio. Id. at 67. Rendition of the fugitive slave was not
sought. The alleged conduct was not against the laws of Ohio. Id. at 68.
218. See, for the debate over whether these alternatives were within the Court's power,
supra note 90.
219. See WIECEK, supra note 6, at 54-56; see also Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 193, 209-10 (1836) (suggesting that in the immediate post-Revolutionary period, a
master litigated "faintly" for a slave, "for such was the temper of the times, that a restless,
discontented slave was worth little").
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numbers of slaves steadily increased.22 ° Nevertheless, if the Court had
had the courage to take on this one great issue; if it had struck down
the obviously unconstitutional fugitive slave laws early and let the state
"liberty law" procedures protect freedmen from private terrorism; if
the Court had founded its interpretations of the Constitution on the
sentiments of the American people before the slave system had be-
come so politicized, at a time when all courts agreed that slavery was
"odious"; if the Court had early conceived of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as a founding document and imported its principle of
equality into the Constitution, taking the studied silence of the Consti-
tution as warrant rather than as gag; if presidents had not so often
tried to appease the south by judicial appointments congenial to
southern views, is it possible that the tragedy might have been
averted? I am tempted to think so, but as we say, "That is a lot of 'ifs.'
VII. How A "GREATER GOOD" TENDS TO BE MERELY SPECULATIVE
The slave cases, and in particular the fugitive slave renditions, ex-
hibit the moral and political consequences of subordinating justice in
the individual case to some conceived "greater good." The greater
good is not a question of hard facts; it is mere speculation. Sometimes
a legislature is moved to act to accommodate considerations of the
greater good. That is what happened when Congress enacted the fu-
gitive slave laws. But if abstractions about the greater good produce
seriously wrong positive law, enforcement in a country of just ideals
becomes problematic. As we have seen, enforcement of the fugitive
slave laws was ineffective in the north.
In fact, nothing in Ableman could mollify the south. In southern
eyes, northerners had turned into abolitionist extremists, and the in-
creasingly strident moralism of northerners had become simply insult-
ing to southern honor. John Brown, who tried to stir up a slave revolt,
was a hero to northern enthusiasts, but a terrorist to the south.221
John Brown's raid seemed to confirm in southern eyes the logical
ends of northern hysteria: black violence and white ruin.
More to the point, the reality was that northern appeasement had
nothing to do with, and could not reverse the erosion of, southern
power in the national government. To the southern mind the sympa-
thy of the Supreme Court was not enough; the efforts of Congress, the
220. See WIECEK, supra note 6, at 56.
221. A good account is in ALLAN NEVINS, 2 ORDEAL OF THE UNION 70-97 (1950). For
northern condemnations of John Brown, see FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 303.
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repeal of the old political compromise 222 -none of it was enough.
Lincoln's election would have precipitated secession however accom-
modating northern courts were to the slave interest. Lincoln's elec-
tion was important not because he was perceived as favorable to
abolition simply, but because it showed that a presidential election
could be carried without a single southern state. In the electoral col-
lege, in the Congress, in the cabinet, the south could conclude that it
had lost the game.
Although some commentators have commended northern efforts
at appeasement, 22 3 and although one can grant that the judges who so
desperately struggled to appease the south meant well, that policy was
never sound. As Abraham Lincoln pointed out in his A House Divided
speech, the Union would have had to become all slave or all free, "all
one thing, or all the other," or it could not stand.22 4 The house could
not stand, among other things, because conflicts would be inevitable.
From this point of view, it would not matter whether the slave states
seceded or not. The conflicts would persist.
It was a delusion, then, that an occasional rendition of some
slave, fugitive or in transit, could appease the south and save the
Union. A northern court's occasional recognition of slave status, re-
mitting a black to a life of bondage, or the occasional conviction of a
would-be rescuer by a northern jury, though watched with great inter-
est in southern papers and courts, could not avert "the impending
crisis. "225 No matter how many successful renditions of fugitive slaves
the north achieved, the south would rebel when the balance of na-
tional political power shifted decisively to the north.
In any event, northern courts could not have succeeded in order-
ing the return of more fugitives to bondage. The angry crowds that
increasingly attended such attempts at rendition as were made suggest
that northern courts were accomplishing all that was politically possi-
ble for them to accomplish. But for political reasons even vigorous
222. The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820. Act
of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277. The Compromise had made all territory north of
Missouri's southern border free, except for Missouri. The Kansas-Nebraska Act repealed
these understandings with respect to Kansas and Nebraska, and opened those territories to
"popular sovereignty." Id. at 283, 289. The predictable consequence was that curtain-
raiser to the Civil War, "bleeding Kansas."
223. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 7, at 600-01 (commending the northern courts that
reached "accommodation" with the laws of slave states).
224. Abraham Lincoln, Speech, "A House Divided" (June 16, 1858), in ABRAHAM LIN-
COLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 372 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946). This speech was deliv-
ered to the Illinois Republican Convention. Id.
225. Cf HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH AND How TO
MEET IT (Collier Books 1963) (1857).
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enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act could not have placated the
south. At most it might have bought time. It is hard to justify, for any
provisional gain of that kind, the costs of such a policy to human lib-
erty and life.
VIII. MESSAGES OF THE SLAVERY CASES
The slavery cases are a wonderful display of how conflicting laws
really emerge at the forum, not as clashes of sovereign power, but
rather as internalized policy conflicts of the forum state. If this is as
generalizable an observation as I think, it identifies the theoretical ba-
sis for the realist insight that the forum always applies its own law.
The slavery cases beautifully show that the canonical "conflicts"
cases, the two-state cases, even where political viewpoints are deeply
divided and entrenched, are not fundamentally distinguishable from
wholly domestic cases. In each case there is the same internal policy
clash. In the slavery cases you see conflicts between some supposed
greater good that it is thought would be served by applying disfavored
rules of law on the one hand, and law that is fundamentally right and
just on the other. My point is that it does not matter whether these
internal conflicts occur in two-state cases or in wholly domestic cases.
The only difference between a two-state case and a domestic case is
the additional flexibility a judge might have in deciding the two-state
case by virtue of the access it affords to choice-of-law justifications.
The slavery cases in northern courts luridly display the sort of
injustice that can result when courts allow some speculative greater good
to defeat the ideal of justice in the individual case. These cases cast a
dark shadow indeed on the orthodox advice to courts in two-state
cases to consider "multistate policies," or "the needs of the interstate
(or international) systems." '22 6 The northern cases remind us, rather,
that the very purpose of the judicial function is to secure justice for
the individual-sometimes, if need be, in the teeth of the system and
its "needs."2 2 v
226. For one Founder's insight on this point, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY 90, 90-91 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986) (complaining that the Constitution as
submitted for ratification omitted "a bill of rights providing clearly ... for. trials ...
triable by the laws of the land and not by the law of Nations" (emphasis added)).
227. Consider, on this problem of "the greater good," Symposium, Nazis in the Courtroom:
Lessons from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges Under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy,
France, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1121 (1995); David Luban, A Report on the Legality of Evil: The Case
of the Nazi Judges, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1139, 1145 (1995) (arguing that the Nazi judges were
trained to apply law with the greater good of the state in mind rather than woodenly or
positivistically, as had been supposed). Article 2 of the German Criminal Code of 1935
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Indeed, it seems likely that considerations of the greater good are
inherently suspect. It may well be time for courts that have adopted
the Restatement (Second) to make a common law modification. "[T] he
needs of the interstate and international systems" should be deleted
or at the very least demoted from the top of the list,228 and the "re-
quirements of justice in the individual case" should finally be brought
explicitly to bear-and be given pride of place.
At the same time, the slavery cases in the southern courts stand as
a warning to those who would deprive courts altogether of the option
of purporting to choose foreign law. One can be too much of a realist
about such things or perhaps too little of one. Judges need leeway to
depart from bad law when they cannot strike it down, whether they do
so by a narrowing construction or by holding that another state's law
unavoidably "governs."
The slavery cases also help us to see that, in a society ofjust ideals,
unjust results cannot be imposed upon a class of cases for long, as a
practical matter, even when the political and executive branches exer-
cise little leadership or perverse leadership. Like the prosecution of
unjust wars in open societies, the enforcement of unjust laws in indi-
vidual cases in societies of just ideals can become very difficult. In-
dependent courts sit to declare individual rights and to furnish
remedies for wrongs, and their authority can be compromised when
they persist in trying to enforce seriously wrong law.
At the extreme limits of morality, the slavery cases, especially
those in the south, strikingly show what is, in fact, a common, if peren-
nially perplexing, feature of judicial behavior. Judges do rather well.
Correction: They do well in countries that, like ours, are, if not just
societies, at least societies ofjust ideals. Courts with common law pow-
ers make terribly wrong decisions, and we all remember the worst of
them; nonetheless, in the end it seems true that, "freedom slowly
broadens down/ From precedent to precedent."221 Perhaps we show
our belief in the generally good performance of judges when we take
cases and doctrine seriously. The judicial system, because it is costly,
must be based in some part on the assumption that, on average,
judges will do better than a flip of the coin. We have little warrant
even for this unconscious confidence, and in fact, there are always
stated: "Punishment is to be inflicted on persons who commit an act which has been de-
clared punishable by the Criminal Code, or which deserves to be punished according to
the spirit of a rule of criminal law and healthy folk-feeling." Id.
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6(2)(a) (1971).
229. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, You ask me, why, tho' ill at ease, reprinted in THE POETICAL
WORKS OF TENNYSON 60 (Cambridge ed. 1974) (1842).
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thoughtful observers distrustful of courts. Yet judges do see more of
moral dilemmas and have to make harder choices in their daily work
than most people. In this country they write under a duty of taking
account of, and giving some voice to, emerging as well as settled
points of view. They are asked to read reports of the way their domes-
tic laws are viewed abroad. They are asked to consult written declara-
tions of right. They are schooled in and sworn to uphold an
interpreted written Constitution and Bill of Rights, although these
sources of law will be unavailable to them in most private law cases.
They must write opinions and thus think through a position.
Through such means and against such a background they become
aware of dissonances in the laws. Their job, when that happens, is to
make choices. Whether for these or other reasons, judges, conserva-
tive and liberal, seem sometimes to anticipate the course of public
moral evolution or to give effect to an ideal of justice that in the par-
ticular case may not have the impress of positive law, or even the im-
mediate approval of those among whom they live.
So, almost inevitably there will be cases in which judges will cast
about for, and should be able to find, ways of escaping from law that
seems to strike a wrong note or from results with which they are not
comfortable. Among the battery of weapons in the judicial armamen-
tarium, they may look to some choice-of-law device or other formal-
ism; it would be imprudent, even if it were possible, to deny them
access to that option. Recall that spectacular case in which the south-
ern court created that option for itself out of a wholly domestic case,
requiring the executor of an illegal manumitting will to carry the slave
into a free state and execute the will there;230 and the case in which
another southern court did something very similar, allowing a freed-
man, forbidden by law from entering the state or inheriting there, to
receive his legacy in another state.23'
In other slavery cases courts in the deep south managed, again
and again, to evade positive law supporting the slave system. Courts
should be able to call on all sorts of means, even formalistic ones, to
afford justice. In argument before a court, and in the crafting of per-
suasive judicial opinions-"the artificial reason . . . of law"2 32 -the
230. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
232. Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Coke's Rep. 63, 65 (K.B. 1608). Coke there tells us that
KingJames "thought that the law was founded upon reason, and that he... had reason, as
well as the Judges." Id. at 64-65. To which Coke says he replied:
True it was, that God had endowed His Majesty with . .. great endowments of
nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and
causes ... are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and
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uses of formalisms, including methodological formalisms, cannot be
discounted. As a practical matter, even if we were willing to give up
the benefits of formalism, I doubt that we could draw a meaningful
line between reasons on the merits and formal reasons. I doubt that we
could draw a meaningful line, for that matter, between methodological
formalism and substantive formalisms--those evolving sets of test ques-
tions under which cases are considered by courts.
The slavery cases strongly suggest, however, that it has been a mis-
take for courts in our time to have laid it down authoritatively that
such-and-such a particular methodological analysis is the automatic re-
quirement in every two-state case. Those cases show with too painful
clarity that courts must not let the outcome of cases depend upon
abstractions. Why should it matter that the slave state is "interested"?
Is "the seat of the relationship"? Is, as domicile, the status-determin-
ing state? Is the forum? It hurts to point this out, but even the best of
such desiderata is revealed by these extreme cases to be of little or no
utility and almost certainly harmful. The dangers of imposing even
the best of methods on the living case can be imagined, if you per-
form the thought experiment of resolving a conflict of slavery laws
under the Restatement (Second). In the slavery cases, after all, the Re-
statement (Second)'s "place of most significant contact"2 3 with the
master-slave relationship all too often would have been a slave state.
As flexible as the Restatement (Second) is, it emphasizes accommoda-
tions to the greater good,234 when, as the slavery cases so tellingly re-
mind us, the greatest good in courts is justice in the individual case.
Not one of the two-state slavery cases could have been decided
rightly under the law of a slave state, blindly applied. Yet proliberty
rulings obviously could not have been consistently achieved by resort
to any choice-of-law method more abstract than "the slaveowner
loses." Even the vague concept of comity in northern courts, if re-
quired as a first consideration, could not have avoided inhumane re-
sults. In every slavery case, forcing some abstract adjudicatory method
judgment of law, which.., requires long study and experience, before.., a man
can attain to the cognizance of it ....
Id. at 65. For an eloquent typology of some of the forms of legal argument, see PHILIP
BOBBIrI, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991); see generally PHILIP BOBBrrr, CON-
STITUTIONAL FATE (1982). Cf, e.g., Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justi-
fication: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45, 46 (1985); G. Edward White,
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L.
REv. 279, 285 (1973); M.P. Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 35, 40 (1963).
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 188(1) (1971).
234. Id. § 6(2)(a) (stating the court should consider "the needs of the interstate and
international systems").
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preemptively upon an essentially political and moral problem, at the
outset, however superior the method, would channel the mind into
irrelevancies, and in the worst case, could result in a hideous injus-
tice-a decision to remit someone to racial bondage.
Consider a key question before Chief Justice Shaw in the break-
through case of Commonwealth v. Aves.235 The question whether the
slave, Med, rightfully belonged to Aves could be dealt with on the mer-
its, or it could be dealt with as a question of whether the law of a free
state or a slave state "governed." ChiefJustice Shaw dithered with the
choice-of-law question whether the forum was bound to respect the
property rights of an individual under the laws of the domicile, but
then resolved the case by ruling in a moment of greatness that there
could be no property in slaves.236 How could it have advanced Shaw's
thinking to have insisted on some methodological analysis unrelated
to that crucial ruling on the merits?
IX. ON METHODOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS
If it would have made no sense to decide the slavery cases by
some methodological argument unrelated to them, I am not clear why
it would make sense to decide other sorts of cases by some method-
ological argument unrelated to them. I am not clear why we should be
persuaded by justifications that would support a decision whether the
decision were wrong or right. Of course, there are many sorts of legal
issues about which there can be no right answer a priori, and there are
cases in which any decision would be a good one. But the usual case
does not present such a blank face.
In operation, the nature of a methodological system-a fixed
method of deciding how to decide-is to provide reasoning internal to
itself, at a remove from the underlying problem it is intended to attack.
The reasoning that persuades us why a defense should be adopted in a
particular case, notwithstanding the plaintiffs proved allegations, is
very different from the reasoning that shows why a particular state
should be allowed to "govern" that issue, whatever its law turns out to
be. It is the merits that matter.
It has long been understood that there are risks to the sound
functioning of the judicial process when courts resort to abstract sys-
tems of judicial choice, canons of interpretation, bars to adjudication
235. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836).
236. Id. at 216.
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of a subject, prudential principles, and the like.237 Such methods, like
abstract methods of choice of law, risk decision on the merits without
consideration of the merits, leaving bench and bar without the tools
needed in future cases. They risk dismissal of meritorious claims or
the striking of meritorious defenses. They require courts to ignore
the question for decision and to focus argument upon a methodologi-
cal question at too remote a level of abstraction to ensure a just result.
The more persuasive the methodology the more fortuitous may be the
result.
Some formalisms or methodological systems fail us because of
their very evenhandedness and neutrality. They have been approved
precisely because they enable a case to be stated at a level of abstrac-
tion at which they can be stated as "neutral principles." 238 But is neu-
trality truly an appropriate criterion for ways of deciding how to
decide? Very little law, and very few policies underlying law, can be
said to be "neutral." There can be few outcomes to which the law-
giver would be indifferent. It makes no scorekeeper in heaven happy
if the scoreboard of the law says, "Property in Slaves: 10; Liberty of
Persons: 10." If we must have ways of deciding how to decide, we might
want to consider whether it is sufficient that our methods invoke rather
than yield a jurisprudence that is beneficent.
Walter Wheeler Cook's legal-realist critique° of mechanical
choice-of-law rules is sometimes spoken of disparagingly, as having de-
stroyed the old methodological system without having constructed
anything to put in its place. 239 That objection misses the point. Un-
derstanding the legal-realist critique, one would not want to construct
a methodological system.
237. For examples of the enormous critical literature on Frankfurterian "neutral princi-
ples" ofjudicial review, see Thomas C. Grey, Thayer's Doctrine: Notes on Its Origin, Scope, and
Present Implications, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 28 (1993); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's,
21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral
Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982 (1978); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive
Virtues'---A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1
(1964).
238. For a cornerstone of "neutral principles" theory in the Warren Court period, see
the now largely discredited critique of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959)
(arguing that Brown was wrong because no abstract "neutral principle" justified it). For
other exemplars of this now much less influential prong of the legal process school's think-
ing see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); ROBERT G.
MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1958).
239. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56 I-HARv.
L. REv. 1170, 1172-73 (1943) (book review).
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On the other hand, with the experience of the slavery cases be-
hind us, we can see the limits of the realist critique. Nothing in that
critique requires that judges be deprived of the serviceable expedient
of avoiding forum law in a particular case without having to shoulder
the burden of overtly changing it. Nothing in that critique requires
depriving the parties of a serviceable pleading option.
X. CHOOSING LAW AND ADOPTING LAw
How, then, should law be chosen? How should cases be decided?
It would be a significant advance, if a conscious choice among the
conflicting laws of concerned states is to be made, that that process be
converted into a process of thinking about the actual problem a case
presents.
Although it is the received positivistic wisdom that we cannot
think about law until we know which law we are thinking about, the
deeper truth is that we cannot make choices of law until we under-
stand the respective laws in relation to the requirements of the partic-
ular case. It would be an advance if we could find a way of making the
assistance of our better methodologies, like the Restatement (Second),
available to courts without requiring them to transmute a living case at
the outset into a problem in parsing methodological language. It is
inferior legal process to muffle a living case in such a way.
We should begin to try argument and decision based on constru-
ing and interpreting the respective laws on their merits, as applied in
the particular case. Functional reasoning of this kind is supposed to
support conventional "interest analysis," but the emphasis has been
put on identifying interested "states," rather than on understanding
the laws contended for. It was the hope of the interest analysts that a
narrowing construction of the foreign law or of forum law could obvi-
ate the necessity of a formal "choice" between them. It was the hope
of the realists that courts would come to be more frank about the
extent to which they were free to fashion law for a case.
It often happens that, in a wholly domestic case, a court will con-
sider what rule for such a case is most suitable for adoption. In such
cases one often sees courts surveying the prevailing legal approaches
to a given problem, in order to adopt one of these as its own. Simi-
larly, it is not implausible that even in a two-state case, a court could
insulate the case from methodological thinking by surveying a
number of prevailing legal approaches to the problem the case
presents, including that of the other state, and ultimately adopting
some third approach as its own, transforming the postponed "choice-
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of-law" question into a more jurisprudential exercise, and in the end
dissolving the alleged conflict.
Professor Juenger has on occasion proposed that the forum
should "choose the best law available."24 This formulation seems to
have frightened almost everyone, including its author.241 It is as if he
had let slip away, down the black hole of choice of law, the comforting
verities of the common law method. Yet of course we expectjudges to
try to fashion the best law they can, by their lights, for every litigated
issue. When an issue of law is litigated, a court even in a wholly do-
mestic case must decide, after all, between two well-argued positions.
Legal developments in other states are continually argued in or-
dinary domestic cases, and the forum is continually urged to adopt
one of those approaches as its own. The operative word here is adopt.
There need be no knitting of brows: it has been a misapprehension
that the forum is "applying' the rule of some "irrelevant' state when it
"adoptS' a new rule.2 42 Nothing in either the Due Process Clause or
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 4 forbids a relevant ("interested") forum
from resolving under its own laws and policies a legal dispute over
which it has jurisdiction; 244 nothing requires this "interested" forum,
in attempting to resolve a dispute, to disregard its own views of what is
best, simply because the best solution was first tried elsewhere.
It does not matter whether the adopted rule is that of a state "inter-
ested" in the particular case or not, as long as the forum is. When in a
conflicts case the forum "adopts" law as its own, it is using powers it
240. JUENGER, supra note 4, at 195-97, 213.
241. Cf id. at 165-67 (suggesting a need to overrule Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S
64 (1938), and restore Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), to permit federal courts to
develop a separate body of substantive law for two-state cases); Borchers, supra note 4, at
129-31 (arguing that federal courts should have the ability to "apply the most modern and
just of the available laws"); Cox, supra note 4, at 533 n.46 ("This does not mean, however,
that the forum should seek law outside of its own sphere of influence or should try to apply
law to situations outside of its proper sphere of influence."). I think Larry Kramer, Appen-
dix D: Letter from Larry Kramer to Harry C. Sigman, Esq., August 29, 1994, 28 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 475 (1995), should not be read as expressing such concerns.
242. I hope this simple positivistic explanation of a familiar form of argument will be
useful for those who have seen due process (or Erie) as standing in the way of a court's
adopting a better rule found in an "irrelevant" state. See supra note 241. On the link be-
tween Erie and due process see LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS, CASES AND COMMENTS
ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 13-14 (1994); Weinberg, supra note 24, at 809-
14.
243. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
244. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (holding that the interested
state has legislative jurisdiction). The uninterested state, of course, is disempowered; the
solution at a neutral forum is a choice of the best of the interested states' laws. See Louise
Weinberg, Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the ALI's Proposed Choice Rule,
56 ALB. L. REv. 807, 851 (1993).
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already has, powers it has in wholly domestic cases as well. It has never
mattered in the domestic case whether any of the alternative solutions
argued to the forum have a provenance in a state that is "interested"
in, or that has "significant contacts" with, the case at bar. That is not
what such argumentation is about.
The chief difference between these two conceptions, applying or
adopting law, is that in adopting law a court does something momen-
tous: it changes its own law, not just for the particular case, but for all
cases. It acknowledges that its position needed revision and it makes
the revision. In choosing to apply another state's laws, on the other
hand, the court postpones any overt confrontation with its policy diffi-
culties. One can see how useful true choice-of-law methodology can
be, if what is wanted is political cover for a given result. But if what is
wanted is good law, for this case and all future cases, of course the
forum is free to say what good law is.
There is nothing about judicial adoption of preferred law that
should raise a special difficulty about relative values. It is not a ques-
tion of "letting" judges say what is "best." It is a question of hoping,
when they do decide issues of law, as they must, that the result will be
good. One of the ways we can make it harder for them to decide well
is to confine their discretion by requiring them to subordinate justice
in the individual case to some totem of methodological theory.
XI. CONCLUSION: TRUE CONFLICTS RESOLVED ON THEIR MERITS
I have said, in favor of conflicts methodology, that I do not see
why a party should be denied the opportunity of pleading a particular
claim or defense "under" the law of another "interested" sovereign,
which (due process being satisfied) a court presumptively will respect.
I have also said that I do not see why a court should be denied the
opportunity of resorting to a "choice of law" to solve an otherwise in-
tractable problem.
But our consideration of the slavery cases, I am afraid, demolishes
the argument that some abstract methodological intervention should
be superimposed preemptively at the outset upon two-state cases.
Taking more seriously the realists' insistence that all cases are funda-
mentally the same, formally "choosing" law becomes only one among
a number of options. Construction on the merits, for example, and if
available, "adoption" of any state's perceived better approach, should
be among the natural ways of resolving a conflict of policies in the
two-state case as in the domestic case. This suggests that, if a way can
be found to do so, the adroit court will postpone formal "conflicts"
reasoning or any other methodological intervention in the adjudica-
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tion of a case on its merits, to be used as a last resort. Of course this
becomes harder to do when the parties come storming into court de-
manding an immediate choice-of-law ruling. But surely it was better
judging and better statecraft when Massachusetts's Chief Justice Shaw
ruled in Aves that there can be no property in slaves,245 than it would
have been had he ruled, unconvincingly, that the place of temporary
sojourn "governs" slave status. It is a measure of how wrong our meth-
odological wrong turns may have been that courts today do not seem
to have the easy access to the merits of a two-state case that their breth-
ren enjoyed even in the gloom of the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, a court does need to keep its choice-of-law guns in
reserve. It may need them. Although I have argued here that meth-
odological systems, divorced from the merits, are dangerous and unre-
liable in the decision of cases, we have seen that any such view must
make room for the covert and paradoxical utility of such formalisms.
Methodological argument can provide a grateful exit from a tight cor-
ner. It can lend a justifying color to a decision taken. It can give
essential political cover, as some southern slavery cases show, to just
decisions in unjust societies; in such societies judicial subterfuge be-
comes noble resistance.
The best methodological systems, like the great private codifica-
tion celebrated in this Symposium, can show what the better judges
would have done in any event without them, and even, sometimes,
turn the inquiring mind to the actual problem on the merits that a
case presents. And they can develop, over time, needed barriers to a
too-ready judicial acquiescence in some supposed "greater good," and
a proper emphasis upon the overriding judicial duty of providing jus-
tice in the individual case.
245. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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